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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their 
businesses.  The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.  By law employers are not permitted to 
unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.  They have 
to obtain the consent of the affected employees.  This is where collective bargaining fits in. 
The employer has to negotiate with the employees.  One way in which through the process of 
collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes 
is to effect a lock-out. 
 
Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was 
permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon.  This conditional dismissal had 
to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s 
demand.  In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal.  This 
made the lock-out quite effective. 
 
The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a 
means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual 
interest.  Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option.  The 
employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion.  The definition of a lock-out in terms 
of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal.  This makes the lock-out option to be 
less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. 
 
However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they 
follow a fair procedure.  Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the 
operational requirements of a business.  If the employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are 
unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them.  The 
employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the 
changes.  He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. 
 iv 
 
The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees 
to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations 
Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as 
contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii).  Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly 
prohibits  the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some 
tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on 
operational grounds. 
 
The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no 
tension whatsoever between the two sections.  The court has also ruled that the dismissals that 
are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of 
reemployment.  According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the 
employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand.  Dismissals not accompanied 
by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the 
employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. 
 
This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of 
opening the floodgates.  Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement 
of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the 
form of a dismissal.  As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is 
final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). 
 
Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to 
resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip.  It is an 
option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of 
replacement labour is prohibited.  The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a 
permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during 
negotiations.  This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and 
conditions of employment a farce.  The employer would have an upper hand. 
 
The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching.  The long held view that 
dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under 
serious challenge.  Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining 
 v 
arena.  Permanent dismissals are permitted.  This negates the very purpose of the collective 
bargaining process. 
 
This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of 
section 187(1)(c).  The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what 
the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. 
 
The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored.  
Recommendations are made to that effect. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In an increasingly competitive market, employers may be forced to introduce changes to the 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment in order to survive, increase profitability, 
enhance efficiency and respond to the technological changes.  The need to effect change to 
the employees’ terms and conditions of employment could be triggered by the fact that the 
existing terms are no longer responsive to the employer’s operational needs.  The importance 
of the responsiveness of the employee’s terms and conditions of employment to the 
employer’s operational requirements was aptly captured by Zondo in Freshmark (Pty) Ltd v 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration.1
That there could be situations where the may be a need to effect changes to the employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment was also emphasized in A Mauchle (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Precision Tools v NUMSA where the court held that “employees do not have a vested right to 
preserve their working obligations unchanged as from the moment when they first began to 
work”.
 
 
An employer enters into a certain contract of employment with an employee on certain terms 
and conditions because he or his business or undertaking requires an employee who is 
prepared to work in accordance with those terms and conditions in order to meet the 
operational requirements of the business or undertaking.  When that contract of employment 
as a whole or some of its terms and conditions can no longer serve or no longer suit the 
operational requirements of the business, that is a valid reason for the employer to terminate 
that contract of employment. 
 
2
Notwithstanding the fact that there may be instances where an employer may be forced to 
effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, it is important to note 
that the employer is not allowed to introduce such changes without following fair processes.  
 
 
                                                 
1  (2003) 24 ILJ 373 (LAC) at para 25. 
2  (1995) 16 ILJ 349 (LAC). 
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For instance, when effecting such changes, the employer cannot act unilaterally.  The Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 strictly prohibits introduction of unilateral changes.  According to 
section 64(4) of the Labour Relations Act the following consequences flow from such an 
action: 
 
• The employees may go on strike and require the employer not to effect the change. 
• If the change has been effected, the employer may be requested to restore the status quo. 
 
It is therefore imperative that when introducing changes to the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment, consent of the affected employees must be obtained.  This is 
where the collective bargaining process plays an important role. 
 
According to Salamon3 collective bargaining can be defined as a method of determining the 
terms and conditions of employment and regulating the employment relationship, which 
utilizes the process of negotiation between representatives of management and employees and 
results in an agreement which may be applied uniformly across a group of employees.  The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa categorically states that every trade union, 
employer’s organization and the employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining.4  
The importance of the collective bargaining process in labour relations is further underlined 
by the fact that one of the primary objects of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is to 
promote orderly collective bargaining.5
Collective bargaining mainly focuses on settling terms and conditions of employment, and 
other matters of mutual interest between employers and employees.  Matters of mutual 
interest can broadly be regarded as including issues relating to terms and conditions of 
employment like employee compensation, remuneration and service benefits.  In Rand Tyre 
and Accessories (Pty) Ltd & Appel v Industrial Council for the Motor Industry (Transvaal), 
Minister of Labour, and Minister for Justice
 
 
6
                                                 
3  Industrial Relations. Theory and Practice 4th ed (2003) 323. 
4  S 23(5). 
5  S 1(d)(i). 
6  (1941) TPD 108 at 115. 
 the concept of “matters of mutual interest 
between the employer and employee” was defined as “whatever can be fairly and reasonably 
regarded as calculated to promote the well-being of the trade, must be of mutual interest to 
them”. 
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In the labour relations sphere disputes are normally categorized into two types, the disputes of 
interest and disputes of right.  In Gauteng Provinsiale Adminstrasie v Scheepers7 a dispute of 
right was defined as a dispute over an already existing right that could be located in a statute, 
collective agreement or contract of employment.  Disputes of right are resolved through 
arbitration and adjudication.  Dismissal is permitted in the dispute of rights sphere.  In 
SADTU v Minister of Education8
Under the 1956 Labour Relations Act employers were allowed to make use of tactical 
dismissal or temporary dismissal within the context of a lock-out.
 the concept of a dispute of interest was explained as 
referring to a dispute relating to proposals for the creation of new rights or the diminution of 
existing rights and are normally resolved by collective bargaining.  The process allows the 
involved parties to make use of power play in the form of strikes and lock-outs when there is 
an impasse.  In the process of collective bargaining dismissal as a weapon of pressurizing the 
other party is strictly forbidden.  Disputes arising from matters of mutual interest are regarded 
as interest disputes. 
 
Within the context of collective bargaining one of the tools that employers have at their 
disposal is the lock-out.  Various pieces of legislation have acknowledged this notion.  Both 
the 1956 Labour Relations Act and the 1995 Labour Relations Act permitted the use of a 
lock-out in the collective bargaining process.  The only point at which they differed was in 
relation to the use of dismissal by the employer within the process of effecting a lock-out. 
 
9
                                                 
7  (2000) 21 ILJ 1305 (LAC) at 1309J. 
8  (2001) 22 ILJ 2325 (LC) at para 43. 
9  S 1(d). 
  This enabled employers to 
resort to dismissal as long as that dismissal was intended to make employees to comply with 
any demands or proposals relating to terms and conditions of employment.  It is very 
important to note that under the 1956 Labour Relations Act the dismissals that were permitted 
within the context of collective bargaining were those that clearly had a purpose of 
compelling employees to accept demands relating to terms and conditions of employment, in 
the sense that they were subject to being withdrawn should the employees accept an 
employer’s demand. 
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However, the 1995 Labour Relations Act strictly forbids the dismissal of employees in order 
to compel them to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the 
employer and employees.10  Such a dismissal is regarded as being automatically unfair and has 
serious consequences for the affected employer.  This is intended to protect employees against 
unfair dismissals where an employer may try to strengthen its hold by threatening to dismiss 
employees if they do not agree to his demands during the collective bargaining process.  
Allowing an employer to resort to dismissal during the collective bargaining process would 
effectively weaken the position of employees.  One of the options that an employer can use of 
as a way of reinforcing his demands is a lock-out11
However, there is no guarantee that the options legally available to the employer may produce 
the desired results.  Negotiations may take a long time and may even fail to yield any result 
for the employer as the employees may be unwilling to accept the proposed changes.  The 
lock-out may also be costly, particularly an offensive lock-out where an employer is not 
allowed to make use of replacement labour.
 but not dismissal during the collective 
bargaining process.  Disputes of interest must be resolved through power play. 
 
Proposed changes to the terms and conditions of employment can be classified as falling 
within the category of matters of mutual interest, thereby giving rise to interest disputes which 
have to be resolved through collective bargaining.  In this regard, the employer cannot 
introduce the changes unilaterally.  He also cannot dismiss the employees as a way of 
compelling them to accept the proposed changes, as this would constitute an automatically 
unfair dismissal. Instead he may resort to power-play.  The employer may have to negotiate 
with the employees in order to effect changes to their terms and conditions of employment.  
Alternatively, the employer may resort to a lock-out.  
 
12
Under these circumstances the question is whether the employer who must respond to the 
market demands or face financial ruin can resort to dismissing those employees who are 
unwilling to have their terms and conditions of changed so that they can be responsive to the 
operational requirements of the business.  Issues around terms and conditions of employment 
normally fall within the ambit of matters of mutual interest which have to be resolved through 
 
 
                                                 
10  S 187(1)(c). 
11  S 64(1). 
12  S 76(1)(b). 
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the process of collective bargaining.  In the same vein, the very same terms and conditions of 
employment issues (which fall within the collective bargaining process ambit), like change in 
working shifts can give rise to a situation where an employer due to factors like globalization, 
stiff competition, profit-making could be compelled to introduce changes to the enterprise in 
order to meet operational requirements of the enterprise.  In this case, the competing interests 
of the employees’ right to employment and the employer’s right to run his business 
successfully would be involved.  That an employer has a right to run his enterprise 
successfully through responding to market changes was succinctly captured in Schoeman v 
Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd13
“An employer in the private sector needs to be able to survive and prosper economically.  
To do this the employer must meet changed market circumstances and be competitive.  
To meet the changes of the market adaptations are required.  An employer needs the 
flexibility to deploy, reasonably, quickly and efficiently, the resources at the employer’s 
disposal.”
  this way: 
 
14
If employees refuse to accept those changes which are necessary for the business to survive, 
the business may not be able to meet its operational requirements and in that case the 
employer may be forced to dismiss those employees.  In this case the employees would be 
dismissed not as a way of compelling them to accept a demand in respect of a matter of 
mutual interest but because they are unable to meet the operational requirements of the 
enterprise.  The Labour Relations Act permits employers to dismiss on the grounds of 
operational requirements, provided that a fair procedure is followed.
 
 
15
In essence matters of mutual interest may in certain circumstances become issues of right.  A 
dispute that may have started as a matter of mutual interest dispute (normally resolved 
through collective bargaining) may suddenly become a rights dispute where an employer can 
justifiably resort to dismissal.  This paradoxical situation was succinctly captured in 
Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd,
 
 
16
“An employer may not dismiss employees in order to compel acceptance of a demand but 
this does not prevent the employer resorting to dismissal for operational requirements in a 
genuine case.”
 when Landman J stated that: 
 
17
                                                 
13  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC). 
14  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 18. 
15  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
16  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC). 
17  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 19. 
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This poses serious challenges when it comes to balancing the interests of the employer to run 
an enterprise efficiently and in some cases even resort to dismissal to ensure the survival, 
profitability and efficiency of the enterprise against the employees’ right to employment.  The 
employer-employee relationship is characterized by inherent inequality with the employer in a 
very powerful position.  By effectively prohibiting dismissal and only permitting resort to 
power-play in respect of interest disputes involving matters of mutual interest the collective 
bargaining process seeks to introduce some balance in the relationship.  However, an 
employer is entitled to run his business in a prosperous way and this may entail effecting 
changes to terms and conditions of employment when the market forces demand so.  In line 
with the purpose of the 1995 Labour Relations Act which is to advance economic 
development as well as social justice,18
This situation where an issue (concerning terms and conditions of employment) which is a 
matter of mutual interest and which gives rise to an interest dispute which is resolved through 
collective bargaining but can at the same time become a right dispute where the employer 
would have a right to resort to dismissal, poses a dilemma in the labour relations sphere.  This 
brings about tension between sections 187(1)(c) and 188(1)(a)(ii) of the 1995 Labour 
Relations Act.  Section 187(1)(c) forbids employers from dismissing employees in order to 
compel them to accept a demand in any matter of mutual interest between the employer and 
employee.  It can be said this section was intended to effectively get rid of the dismissal lock-
out which was one of the options that was available to the employer in the collective 
bargaining process under the 1956 Labour Relations Act.
 the challenge is to strike a balance between the two 
competing interests. 
 
19
                                                 
18  S 1. 
19  S 1(d). 
  On the face of it this section 
appears to effectively outlaw dismissal even if it is temporary within the context of collective 
bargaining.  Section 188(1)(a)(ii) permits employers to dismiss on operational requirements 
grounds.  This means that even within the context of collective bargaining, where for instance 
an employer wants to change the terms and conditions of employment and the employees 
refuse to accept those changes  the employer may dismiss employees on operational grounds, 
subject the condition that the procedures laid out in section 189 are followed. 
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This paradoxical situation has the potential of giving rise to a situation where, despite the 
noble intention of outlawing dismissal within the context of collective bargaining in the form 
of a dismissal lock-out, which section 187(1)(c) might have been enacted for, employers may 
still resort to dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements which is fully permitted by 
section 188(1)(a)(ii) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act.  This possibility was succinctly 
expressed in Contemporary Labour Law where in relation to the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
(referred to as the NLRA or the New Labour Relations Act) this observation was made: 
 
“The NLRA has done away with the concept of the dismissal lockout.  This concept was 
one of the tools of management to change terms and conditions of employment and the 
manner in which workplace activities were performed.  With the demise of this 
mechanism the attention of employers will turn to that other mechanism, which has 
always been something of a companion to the dismissal lock-out, namely dismissal for 
operational requirements.”20
“Section 187(1)(c) makes the classic lockout dismissal automatically unfair.  An 
employer may no longer dismiss employees to compel them to accept new terms and 
conditions of employment.  But how different is that from dismissing an employee on 
grounds of operational requirements because the employer needs to change a term or 
condition of employment and the employee refuses to agree to it?  This is precisely the 
question that Landman J grappled with in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 
(1998) 19 ILJ 62 (LC) at 67.  He recognized that the purpose is the same- to change terms 
and conditions of employment.  The reasons for changing terms and conditions of 
employment is the same -operational requirements.  He suggested somewhat diffidently, 
that the difference may lie in the procedure to be adopted in effecting the dismissal an 
operational requirements dismissal has to follow a detailed procedure.  But if the reason 
(compelling an employee to accept new terms and conditions) is automatically unfair, 
then complying with section 189 cannot transform the dismissal into a fair one.”
 (my emphasis) 
 
Heaton Cheadle in Current Labour Law  also highlighted this tension in the following way: 
 
21
                                                 
20  “Unfair Dismissal.  The New Rules for Capital Punishment in the Workplace (Part Two)” (1996) Vol 5 
Contemporary Labour Law 51-52. 
21  Cheadle, Le Roux, Thompson and Van Niekerk Current Labour Law (1998) 26. 
 
 
The problem that arises from the tension between the two sections is how to distinguish 
within the context of changing terms and conditions of employment a dismissal that is meant 
to compel employees to accept new terms and conditions of employment, falling within 
section 187(1)(c), from that which is based on operational requirements because the employee 
refuses to accept new terms and conditions of employment (fully justified in terms of section 
188(1)(a)(ii)). 
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This difficulty was hinted by Landman J in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics22
Noting this difficulty Cheadle suggested in Current Labour Law
 when he noted 
that whilst an employer is not allowed to dismiss an employee in order to compel acceptance 
of a demand in relation to terms and conditions of employment, this does not prevent the 
employer from resorting to dismissal for operational requirements in a genuine case.  The 
question then is how to distinguish dismissals which are genuinely necessitated by operational 
requirements from those whose real aim is to compel employees to accept a demand. 
 
23
Also, Thompson in “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements 
Dismissal”
 that the best way out of this 
“conundrum” is to limit ambit of the phrase “operational requirements” to what he termed 
“redundancy situations which are brought about by economic causes” as opposed to structural 
causes which results in employees being dismissed and replaced with subcontractors or other 
employees.  
 
24
“When the contest between management and labour is ‘purely’ over the wage-work 
bargain - in other words the substantive terms of the next collective agreement - dismissal 
will never be permissible.  The ‘for profits’ termination offends against s 187(c).  An 
employer, may argue however, that not a quest for profit but sheer operational 
requirements oblige a particular economic outcome, even to the point of sanctioning the 
discharge of those who hold out.  But the Labour Court should lean against the result that 
follows a dispute on a wage work-deal to escape the protected zone of collective 
 argued that the tension between the two sections has the potential to blur the line 
between matters of mutual interest that should be resolved through collective bargaining 
(where dismissal is strictly prohibited) and those matters that fall within the domain of rights 
disputes where dismissal is permitted.  Noting this intersection between matters of mutual 
interest and matters of right and the ensuing complexity, he suggested that retrenchments 
within the context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment should be 
confined only to situations that are meant to ensure the survival of a business and not be 
allowed where the purpose is to increase profitability.  According to him whilst profitability 
can be classified as an operational requirement, it is not such a compelling requirement when 
compared to the survival of a business.  He emphasized his point as follows: 
 
                                                 
22  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 19. 
23  Cheadle et al Current Labour Law 27. 
24  (1999) 20 ILJ 755. 
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bargaining.  When in exceptional circumstances the case for migration is made, the 
employer must still overcome a formidable fairness hurdle in the judicial process.”25
However, the court in Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa
 
 
Both these suggestions were based on the appreciation of the fact that the line that 
distinguishes a dismissal that is based on section 187(1)(c) and that based on section 
188(1)(a)(ii) is a very fine one.  To put it bluntly, both dismissals emanate from the same 
cause, a desire to introduce changes to terms and conditions of employment. 
 
26
• How will the sanctity of the collective bargaining process where parties engage with 
each other without the fear of dismissal be protected? 
 has expressly rejected the notion that there is tension between the two sections.  The 
court has also rejected out of hand the argument that the phrase “operational requirements” 
within the context of changing terms and conditions of employment  should be strictly limited 
to situations where the survival of a business at stake.  It is against this background that the 
following questions arise: 
 
 
• Given the clear dichotomy between disputes of rights and disputes of interest and how 
these disputes are resolved, how will this dichotomy which has been relied upon by 
courts in the past be maintained? 
 
• How will the possibility of employers commencing their participation in the collective 
bargaining process with the threat of dismissing the employees if they do not agree to 
the demands relating to changing their terms and conditions of employment thereby 
abusing the collective bargaining process, be obviated? 
 
• There may be a very fine line between a dismissal related to compelling an employee to 
accept a demand about changing the terms and conditions of employment and a 
dismissal relating to terms and conditions of employment on grounds of operational 
requirements.  A wrong call by the employer can have serious consequences like having 
the dismissal branded as an automatically unfair dismissal whilst another dismissal 
                                                 
25  Thompson “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” (1999) 20 
ILJ 755 at 755-766. 
26  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
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effected for the very same purpose may be found to be merely unfair.  Given the harsh 
consequences for a dismissal that is automatically unfair, how will fairness principles be 
adhered to when meting out punitive measures for dismissals which may for all intents 
and purposes be emanating from the same source and having the same purpose, albeit 
couched differently? 
 
• What will be the future implications for collective bargaining and indeed labour 
relations? 
 
This study seeks to address these concerns.  Chapter 2 deals with the legal position in South 
Africa in relation to dismissals within the context of collective bargaining.  Chapter 3 analyses 
case law pertaining to dismissals emanating from the process of collective bargaining.  
Chapter 4 looks critically at the implications of the Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA27
                                                 
27  (2003) 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). 
 
judgment.  Chapter 5 looks at ways of possibly resolving the apparent tensions between 
section 187(1)(c) and section 188(1)(a)(ii) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.  Chapter 6 
provides a conclusion to the discussion. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE LEGAL POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN RELATION TO 
DISMISSALS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
 
 
 
 
2 1 THE 1956 LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 
 
Under the 1956 Labour Relations Act the employer was allowed to use dismissal as a way of 
putting pressure on employees to accede to his demands in the process of collective 
bargaining.  This was possible through section 65(d) of that Labour Relations Act according 
to which an employer was allowed to dismiss employees (temporarily) in order to compel 
them to accept demands or proposals concerning terms and conditions of employment.  This 
form of dismissal was classified as a dismissal lock-out and was conditional in the sense that 
once employees accepted the demands relating to terms or conditions of their employment, 
the dismissals would be reversed.  The dismissal had to be strictly subject to being withdrawn 
upon the acceptance of the employer’s demand by the employees.  In essence, the lock-out 
option which is one of the options that an employer can resort to in the collective bargaining 
process was further strengthened by the availability of a conditional dismissal.  This catered 
for the possibility that within the context of collective bargaining employees may refuse to 
accept changes to their terms and conditions of employment which are necessary for the 
efficiency of an enterprise and negotiations may not yield the desired results.  In terms of the 
1956 Labour Relations Act a lock-out was defined in the following way: 
 
“ ‘Lock-out’ means any one or more of the following acts or omissions by a person who 
is or has been an employer – 
 
(a) the exclusion by him of anybody or number of persons who are or have been in his 
employ from any premises on or in which work provided by him  is or has been 
performed; or 
 
(b) the total or partial discontinuance by him of his business or of the provision of 
work; or 
 
(c) the breach or termination by him of the contracts of employment of any body or 
number of persons in his employ; or 
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(d) the refusal or failure by him to re-employ any body who have been in his employ, if 
the purpose of that exclusion, discontinuance, breach, termination, refusal or 
failure is to induce or compel any persons, who are or have been in his employ or 
in the employ of other persons – 
 
(i) to agree to or comply with any demands or proposals  concerning terms and 
conditions of employment or other matters made by him or on his behalf or 
by or on behalf of any other person who is or has been an employer; or 
 
(ii) to accept any change in the terms  or conditions of employment; or 
 
(iii) to agree to the employment or the suspension or termination of the 
employment of any person.”28
From this definition of a lock-out it is clear that an employer could make use of a dismissal 
within the context of collective bargaining.  What is clear is that the dismissal had to have a 
purpose and also be conditional.  It had to be intended to compel the employee to accept 
demands related to matters of mutual interest and be subject to being withdrawn the moment 
the employees accepted the employer’s demands to effect changes to their terms or conditions 
of employment.
 (my emphasis) 
 
29
In K Ngubane v NTE Limited
  Therefore, it can be said that within the context of collective bargaining 
dismissals were permitted provided that they were functional to collective bargaining.  In this 
way the employer was to a certain degree permitted to unilaterally change the terms or 
conditions of employment through using the termination lock-out option.  
 
30
“The Act requires that the contract must be terminated with the purpose to induce 
acceptance of a demand or proposal ...  The requirement that the termination must have 
this purpose will be met if the employer, simultaneously with the termination, offers each 
employee employment on terms and conditions of employment commensurate with his 
final offer ...  The offer must remain open for acceptance for a specified time (which has 
to be a reasonable time) or an indefinite time.  The offer, if it is indefinite, would lapse 
when it is withdrawn provided that it must remain open for acceptance for a reasonable 
time ...  The employer would in effect couple termination with an offer to obtain re-
employment.  Whilst termination of employment is final, the lock-out ends only when the 
offer of re-employment expires ...”
 the court made the following observation in relation to a lock-
out dismissal: 
 
31
Therefore, an employer was well within his rights to conditionally dismiss employees who 
were unwilling to accept changes to their terms or conditions of employment, as a way of 
 
 
                                                 
28  S 1(a)-(d). 
29  S 1(d)(i)-(ii). 
30  (1990) 1 (10) SALLR 11 (IC). 
31  K Ngubane v NTE Limited supra at 14. 
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inducing them to accept those changes.  This dismissal was subject to the employer making an 
offer of re-employment should the employees accede to his demands.  This would make the 
dismissal fair.  Such a termination of employment (conditional) constituted a lock-out in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.32  This principle was also emphasised in 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Eveready SA (Pty) Ltd33
It is clear that within the collective bargaining context, employers could legitimately resort to 
conditional dismissal as a weapon of compelling employees to accept their demands, provided 
that the dismissals were subject to being withdrawn if the demands were accepted by the 
employees.  If the dismissals were not coupled with an offer of re-employment upon 
acceptance of the offer , then such dismissals were held to be outside the ambit of the lock-out 
definition and consequently unfair.  In CCAWUSA v Game Discount World Ltd
 where it was held that the 
employer had acted fairly when he  terminated the employees’ services and offered to re-
employ them if they accepted his offer. 
 
34
“There can be no lock-out if the act forming part of the lock-out was not performed for 
one of the specified purposes.  The employer who introduces a lock-out must do so to 
achieve a purpose.  In casu the act which purportedly introduced the lock-out was the 
dismissal on 11 October 1989.  That dismissal was, and was intended to be final and 
irrevocable.  The individual applicants were not dismissed to compel or induce them to 
accept respondent’s demand.  The fact that the notice to the employees was for that 
purpose, does not assist the respondent.  The termination should have been for that 
purpose.”
 an 
employer, after having failed to reach an agreement in negotiations about wages and other 
terms and conditions of employment, dismissed the employees.  The employer indicated that 
the dismissals were final and irrevocable and not subject to being withdrawn upon acceptance 
of the demands.  The court held that the dismissals fell outside the ambit of the lock-out 
definition and were therefore unlawful.  The court made the following observation: 
 
35
Also, in CWIU v Indian Ocean Fertilizer
 
 
36
                                                 
32  S 65(d)(i)-(ii). 
33  (1990) 11 ILJ 338 (IC). 
34  (1990) 11 ILJ 162 (IC). 
35  CCAWUSA v Game Discount World supra at 1651. 
36  (1991) 12 ILJ 822 (IC), 
 where an employer locked out employees until 
they unconditionally accepted the final wage offer and after six weeks ended the lock-out and 
dismissed the employees finally and irrevocably, the dismissal was held to be unfair since it 
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lacked the important element of being coupled with an offer of re-instatement and also did not 
have the purpose of compelling the employees to accept the final wage offer of the employer. 
 
Moreover, in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aerial King Sales (Pty) Ltd37
“There is, however, nothing in the Act that suggests that para (c) of the definition of a 
lock-out permits an employer to use the lock-out weapon to achieve a valid final 
dismissal of its employees.  To dismiss employees because they do not want to accept 
management’s final offer on wages cannot constitute a valid reason for dismissal.
 
where the employer had dismissed employees for refusing his final wage offer, the prohibition 
of final dismissals within the context of collective bargaining was emphasized this way: 
 
38
In conclusion, under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, dismissal, provided that it was 
conditional, was accepted as a legitimate instrument of coercion in the collective bargaining 
process.  Employers were permitted to make use of dismissal as a way of compelling 
employees to agree to demands or proposals concerning terms or conditions of employment.  
However, such dismissals were subject to the fact that they had to be coupled with an offer of 
re-employment upon the employees’ acceptance of the demands of the employer.  Dismissal 
emanating from the context of proposing changes to terms and conditions of employment, and 
not subject to being withdrawn upon employees’ acceptance of the employer’s demand, fell 
outside the ambit of the lock-out since they were final and irrevocable. Such dismissal were 
held to be unlawful.
 
 
39
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 also permits the employer to use the lock-out option as 
a way of enforcing his demands in the process of collective bargaining.  The Act states 
explicitly that “every employer has recourse to lockout”.
 
 
2 2 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
2 2 1 SECTION 213 AND THE DEFINITION OF A LOCK-OUT 
 
40
“the exclusion by an employer of employees from the employer’s workplace, for the 
purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
   The Labour Relations Act of 1998 
defines a lock-out as: 
 
                                                 
37  (1994) 15 ILJ 1384 (IC). 
38  (1994) 15 ILJ 1384 (IC) at 1393. 
39  CWIU v Indian Ocean Fertilizer (1991) 12 ILJ 822 (IC). 
40  S 64(1). 
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mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or not the employer breaches 
those employees’ contracts of employment in the course of or for the purpose of that 
exclusion”.41
An employer, in terms of this definition may only physically exclude the employees as a way 
of compelling them to accept his demands in any matter of mutual interest but not dismiss 
them.  This may be seen in the light of the fact that one of the primary objects of the 1995 
Labour Relations Act is to promote orderly collective bargaining.
 
 
From this definition it is clear that unlike the 1956 Labour Relations Act where the definition 
of a lock-out made provision for an employer to dismiss employees as a way of compelling 
them to accept a demand concerning terms and conditions of employment, such a dismissal is 
not catered for.  In terms of this Act the termination of employees’ contracts, whether 
conditional or final, as a way of inducing compliance with the employer’s demands is not 
permissible within the context of collective bargaining.  
 
42
(c) to compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between the employer and employee.”
  Allowing employers the 
right to dismiss, even if it is a conditional dismissal, would disrupt the balance of forces in the 
collective bargaining process, thereby undermining one of the primary objects of the Labour 
Relations Act. 
 
It could also be said that this is indicative of the intention not weaken or prejudice the 
employee’s position during the collective bargaining process, through for instance, permitting 
the employer to resort to dismissal in the collective bargaining process when there is a 
deadlock. 
 
2 2 2 SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
Section 187(1)(c) reads as follows: 
 
“(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 5, or, if the reason is- 
43
                                                 
41  S 213. 
42  S 1(d)(i). 
43  S 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act. 
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This section categorically states that a dismissal that is intended to compel the employee to 
accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the 
employee is automatically unfair.  This means that during the collective bargaining process an 
employer is strictly prohibited from resorting to dismissing employees as a way of compelling 
them to agree to his demands, even if the dismissal is conditional.  This could be interpreted 
as an appreciation of the fact that the employer-employee relationship is characterized by 
inherent inequality.  If an employer could be allowed to dismiss employees during the 
collective bargaining process not only would the employee’s bargaining position be greatly 
prejudiced but one of the primary objects of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 which is to 
promote orderly collective bargaining44
“collective bargaining, if it is to be effective, must assume a voluntary quality and not 
entail recourse to measures of compulsion which would alter the voluntary nature of such 
bargaining”.
 would also be undermined.  Such a situation would 
render the very essence of collective bargaining meaningless as the employer would be 
allowed to raise the threat of a dismissal, which is more harsh to employees in terms of effects 
than any other mechanism in the collective bargaining, should employees be unwilling to 
accept his demands.  
 
Also, the International Labour Organisation on Freedom of Association states that: 
 
45
In essence, section 187(1)(c) was aimed at categorically doing away with the dismissal lock-
out which employers could resort to under the Labour Relations Act of 1956.  The fact that 
such a dismissal was placed in the category of not just an ordinary unfair dismissal but an 
automatically unfair dismissal which incurs harsher sanctions is indicative of the intention of 
completely doing away with the dismissal lock-out and an attempt not only to jealously 
safeguard the sanctity of collective bargaining where dismissals in relation to disputes 
concerning matters of mutual interest is not allowed, but to provide  protection to the 
 
 
This indicates that measures like dismissal which would amount to some form of compulsion 
which would fundamentally alter the voluntary nature of collective bargaining are not 
permissible in the collective bargaining process.  Permitting employers to resort to such 
measures would threaten the fundamental nature of collective bargaining.  
 
                                                 
44  S 1(d)(i). 
45  Freedom of Association Digest (1996) at 9. 
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employee’s bargaining power through ensuring the use of power-play tactics like strikes and 
lock-outs and not dismissal during the collective bargaining process.  Placing a dismissal that 
is intended to compel employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest within the category of unfair dismissals was intended to ensure that an employer who 
effected such a dismissal would suffer serious consequences. 
 
2 2 3 SANCTIONS THAT EMANATE FROM SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
A dismissal that is automatically unfair incurs harsh consequences for the employer.  The 
importance of meting seriousness sanctions when dealing with automatically unfair dismissals 
was highlighted by Nicholson, JA in CEPPWAWU v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC46
“The reasons listed in s 187 (1) (a) - (f) include dismissals motivated by unfair 
discrimination against an employee directly or indirectly, or any arbitrary ground, 
including race, gender, sex, colour, conscience, belief, political opinion, and others.  A 
dismissal of an employee for any one of those reasons strikes at the essence of the values 
which form the foundations of our new democratic society as enunciated in the 
Constitution. It is a dismissal that undermines the fundamental values that the labour 
relations community in our country depends on to regulate its very existence.  
Accordingly, such a dismissal deserves to be dealt with in a manner that gives due weight 
to the seriousness of the unfairness to which the employee was subjected.” (my 
emphasis).
 this way: 
 
47
This means that a dismissal that is found to have been effected for the purpose of compelling 
an employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest (thereby falling 
within the category of automatically unfair dismissals) will incur a very harsh sanction.  In 
terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 an automatically unfair dismissal may incur a 
penalty of reinstatement, re-employment and compensation.
 
 
48
Moreover, the Labour Court may also in addition make any other order that it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances.
 
 
49  Concerning compensation, an employer may be ordered to 
pay compensation the maximum of which may be 24 months.50
                                                 
46  (2002) 23 ILJ 695 (LAC). 
47  CEPPWAWU v Glass Aluminium 2000 CC supra at 409F. 
48  S 193(1). 
49  S 193(3). 
50  S 194(3). 
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In conclusion, the fact that a dismissal which is intended to compel an employee to accept a 
demand in any matter of mutual interest has been placed within the section of automatically 
unfair dismissals that incur harsh sanctions indicates the intention to effectively proscribe 
such dismissals, irrespective of whether the dismissal is conditional or not.  This also signals 
an unequivocal intention to clearly do away with the termination lock-out. 
 
2 3 THE  TENSION  BETWEEN SECTION 187(1)(c)  AND  SECTION  188(1)(a)(ii) 
 OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
2 3 1 SECTION 187(1)(c) 
 
Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act states categorically that a dismissal that is 
aimed at compelling an employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest is automatically unfair.  This means that within the context of introducing changes to 
terms and conditions of employment an employer is prohibited from resorting to dismissals.  
An employer may have a pressing need to introduce changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment of his employees in order to run his enterprise efficiently and the employees may 
be unwilling to accept such changes.  This could for instance, include changes in the shift 
system and working hours.  This would put the employee in an untenable position of running 
the enterprise inefficiently since the employees would be rejecting the proposed changes 
aimed at bringing about efficiency.  This would obviously be not adding any value to 
functional collective bargaining. In that case, the employer can make use of negotiations or 
the lock-out, for instance, to induce employees to comply with his demands, but he cannot 
resort to dismissing the employees.  This principle was emphasized by Landman J in 
Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd in this way: 
 
“An employer in the private sector needs to be able to survive and prosper economically.  
To do this the employer must meet changed market circumstances and be competitive.  
To meet the changes of the market adaptations are required.  An employer needs the 
flexibility to deploy, reasonably quickly and efficiently, the resources at the employer’s 
disposal.  Various options are open to an employer to achieve this.  One of them is the 
lock-out route which is used to compel acceptance of a demand ...  An employer may not 
dismiss employee in order to compel acceptance of a demand .”51
The employer is precluded from dismissing the employees in order to compel them to accept 
his demands.  In this way the process of collective bargaining ensures that when employees 
 (my emphasis) 
 
                                                 
51  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at paras 18 and 19. 
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are involved in negotiations with the employer, they are protected from being threatened with 
dismissal by the employer, should they not agree to accede to his demands. If an employer 
dismisses the employees, even if the dismissal is conditional and subject to being withdrawn 
should the employees accept the demands of the employer, such a dismissal will be 
automatically unfair and will incur harsh sanctions for the employer.  
 
2 3 2 SECTION 188(1)(a)(ii) 
 
Section 188(1)(a)(ii) reads as follows: 
 
“(1) A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove 
– 
(a) that the reason is a fair reason - … 
(ii) based on the employer’s operational requirements …”52
                                                 
52  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
 
 
This section accords the employer the right to dismiss for operational requirements.  For 
operational requirements dismissals to be substantively and procedurally fair, an employer has 
to comply with the procedures laid out in section 189 of the 1995 Labour Relations Act. 
 
Matters like proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment traditionally fall within 
the ambit of mutual interest and disputes that arise from such matters are normally resolved 
through collective bargaining where dismissal is strictly prohibited.  However, the very same 
matters can overlap and fall within the sphere of operational requirements and effectively 
become disputes of rights where an employer is legitimately allowed to resort to dismissal 
provided that a fair procedure as laid out in section 189 is followed.  This means that even in 
issues relating to matters of mutual interest where for instance an employer wants to introduce 
changes to the employees’ terms and conditions of employment by changing working shifts, a 
matter which under normal circumstances, would fall within the ambit of collective 
bargaining where dismissal is forbidden, the employer may legally be entitled to dismiss those 
employees not because he is compelling the employees to accept his demands but on the 
grounds that such change is necessitated by operational requirements and he wants to replace 
those employees with those willing to work under those terms. 
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One of the unfortunate unintended consequences of this section is that it has the potential to 
convert through manipulation what may be an interest dispute that should be resolved through 
collective bargaining and without using dismissal as a measure of compulsion into a rights 
dispute where dismissal may be resorted to by the employer under the guise of operational 
requirements.  
 
This section also has the potential to undermine the process of collective bargaining as well as 
the intention of the Labour Relations Act to prohibit the use of dismissal in compelling 
acceptance of a demand relating to matters of mutual interest.53
“An employer may not dismiss employees in order to compel acceptance of a demand but 
this does not prevent the employer resorting to dismissal for operational requirements in a 
genuine case.”
  This paradox was highlighted 
in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd when Landman J stated that: 
 
54
Whilst the express intention of section 187(1)(c) was to completely do away with the 
dismissal lock-out, which was permissible under the 1956 Labour Relations Act
 
 
In short, whilst an employer is precluded from using dismissal as a way of inducing 
employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest, there is nothing that 
prohibits an employer from dismissing employees who refuse to accept changes to their terms 
and conditions of employment if he can show that the mooted changes are necessitated by 
operational requirements.  The hurdle that he would then have to clear is to follow the 
conditions stipulated in section 189 of the Labour Relations  Act of 1995. 
 
2 3 3 THE TENSION BETWEEN SECTION 187(1)(c) AND SECTION 188(1)(a)(ii) 
 
55
                                                 
53  S 187(1)(c). 
54  (1997) 10 BLLR 1364 (LC) at para 19. 
55  S 1(d). 
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according to which an employer could use dismissal as way of forcing the employees to 
capitulate to his demands relating to employees’ terms and conditions of employment, it is its 
practical application that has created more problems than solutions, particularly when viewed 
against section 188(1)(a)(ii). 
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Section 187(1)(c) effectively prohibits dismissals as an instrument of coercing an employee to 
accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the 
employee.  However, matters of mutual interest can also generally include matters that are the 
subject of terms and conditions of employment.  These would for example include issues like 
wages, work shifts and leave.  If an employer proposes changes related to some of these 
issues and the employees do not accept the changes, the employer would be precluded from 
dismissing those employees.  Such a dismissal would be automatically unfair.  The intention 
behind this was to ensure that an employer does not evade the collective bargaining process 
by manipulating a dispute of interest and converting it to a right dispute through resorting to 
dismissal. 
 
However, if the employer can, for instance, propose changes relating to work shifts and argue 
that the change in work shift is necessitated by operational requirements he can rely on 
section 188(1)(a)(ii) which permits dismissal on the grounds of operational requirements.  
The employer would argue that the employees are not dismissed as a way of compelling them 
to accept the demands or changes but they are dismissed because those changes are necessary 
for the operational requirements of the business and the employer wants to replace those 
employees with employees who are willing to work under the new changes. 
 
This provides a fertile ground for a situation where an unscrupulous employer, fully knowing 
that options like negotiations and lock-outs may not immediately elicit a positive response to 
a proposal to effect changes to terms and conditions of employment, may from the outset 
during negotiations raise the “spectre” of dismissals for operational requirements as a way of 
exerting pressure on employees to agree to his demand.  In essence, this creates a situation 
where an interest dispute where dismissal is prohibited, can easily migrate into a rights 
dispute where dismissal is permissible.  The unfortunate part of this is that it is quite difficult 
to differentiate clearly whether a dismissal relating to proposals for change to the terms and 
conditions of employment is motivated by a desire to compel employees to accept an 
employer’s demand or is genuinely precipitated by operational requirements.  This is because 
in both instances, proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment plays a central 
role. 
 
It is against this background that Cheadle in Current Labour Law posed this rhetorical 
question: 
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“An employee may no longer dismiss employees to compel them to accept new terms 
and conditions of employment.  But how different is that from dismissing an employee 
on the grounds of operational requirements because the employer needs to change a term 
or condition of employment and the employee refuses to agree to it?”56
The problem stems mainly from the fact that the term “operational requirements” is broadly 
defined in the 1995 Labour Relations Act.  “Operational requirements” refers to requirements 
based on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer.
 
 
The fact that an employer may not dismiss an employee as a way of compelling him to accept 
a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest  but at the same time can still manouvre 
his way out of this prohibition by raising the defence of operational requirements and still 
dismiss employees who are unwilling to accept the demand poses serious challenges for the 
collective bargaining process. 
 
57
This is the problem that confronted the court in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd
  This 
broad definition permits proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment, normally 
classified as matters of mutual interest which are resolved through collective bargaining to 
also fit comfortably within the sphere of disputes of right.  The key issue is where to draw the 
line at which a dispute of interest should move away from being strictly resolved through the 
process of collective bargaining to the arena of a dispute of right where dismissal is 
permissible.  How to distinguish a dismissal, within the context of proposed changes to terms 
and conditions of employment, that is aimed at compelling employees to accept a demand in 
respect of a matter of mutual interest from a dismissal that emanates from the same proposed 
changes to terms and conditions of employment but based on genuine operational 
requirements, is the challenge. 
 
58
                                                 
56  Cheadle et al Current Labour Law 27. 
57  S 213. 
58  (1998) 19 ILJ 62 (LC) at 67. 
 
and where Landman held that the solution, which by his own admission was not the most 
satisfactory one, would be to look at the reason behind the dismissal and whether the 
procedures specified in section 189 of the 1995 Labour Relations Act have been complied 
with when effecting the dismissal.  If the procedures have not been complied with, then the 
dismissal could be regarded as having been aimed at compelling employees to accept a 
demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest and therefore unlawful. 
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Cheadle59
This notion of a restrictive application was further stressed by Thompson
 rejected this approach and argued that if the reason behind the dismissal is to 
compel the employee to accept new terms and conditions of employment and is regarded as 
being automatically unfair, then complying with section 189 cannot transform it into a fair 
one.  He argued instead that the phrase “operational requirements” when applied in the 
context of changes to terms and conditions of employment should be interpreted strictly and 
only refer to redundancy and not to situations where an employer, for instance, seeks to 
replace existing employees with short-term or contract workers.  
 
60
However, the courts have emphatically rejected this restrictive approach in Fry’s Metals v 
NUMSA
 who also 
suggested that the phrase within the context of changes to terms and conditions of 
employment should be applied only to retrenchments that emanate from a situation where the 
survival of the business is under threat and not to situations where the employer seeks to make 
profits.  
 
61 on the basis that there is no statutory basis for such an argument.  This rejection, 
based on the assertion that there is a distinction between a dismissal that is based on 
operational requirements and one that is aimed at compelling employees to accept a demand 
in respect of a matter of mutual interest has resulted in some rather unfair situations.  The 
distinction, being that as long as a dismissal is permanent, it does not fall within section 
187(1)(c), has resulted in a rather absurd situation where two dismissal cases revolving 
around proposed changes to terms and conditions, working shifts systems to be specific, were 
in fact decided differently.  In Fry’s Metals v NUMSA62 where the employer indicated that the 
dismissals were final, the court held that the dismissals were fair.  Fact that the line between 
an automatically unfair dismissal for refusal to accept changed terms.  On the other hand, in 
Chemical Workers Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd63
                                                 
59  Current Labour Law 26-27. 
60  “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” supra. 
61  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) at para 33. 
62  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
63  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
 the employer coupled the dismissal with an 
offer of re-employment and this led the court to rule that the dismissal was automatically 
unfair since it was not final and irrevocable.  
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The fact that the line between a an automatically unfair dismissal for compelling employees 
refusing to accept changed terms and conditions of employment and a legitimate dismissal on 
the grounds of an employer’s operational requirements is often a fine o creates a problem.  An 
employer who couches a dismissal in the wrong way, legally speaking, by showing some 
form of generosity through offering reinstatement can incur serious sanctions whilst the one 
who shows no mercy by terminating the employment relationship permanently may incur less 
serious sanctions, or no sanction whatsoever.  Van Niekerk64
It is for this reason that Van Niekerk
 captures the absurdity of this 
situation this way: 
 
“If the employer intends finally to terminate the employment relationship by dismissing 
its workforce and to employ a new workforce on the terms rejected by those dismissed, 
there is no automatically unfair dismissal. If the dismissal is effected with a more 
equivocal intention, the employer is at risk of an automatically unfair dismissal.” 
 
65
In short, the tension between the two sections can give rise to an absurd situation where two 
employers who may dismiss employees who refuse to accept changes to their terms and 
conditions incurring different sanctions depending on the label that they attach to the 
dismissal.  It may also result in a situation where an employer may circumvent the process of 
collective bargaining by raising the shield of “operational requirements” and using dismissal 
when unable to secure the consent of the affected employees.  This would greatly undermine 
the collective bargaining process.  It is against this background that Thompson
 expresses his opinion concerning the way the courts 
have interpreted section 187(1)(c) this way: 
 
“This is probably the most controversial of the automatically unfair reasons for dismissal. 
The ambit of the provision is ambiguous and its consequences are capacious.” 
 
66
“… when parties are engaged in economic bargaining, one of them should not be allowed 
to pull the plug on the process by threatening the demise of the other if it does not get its 
way.  The courts should look especially critically at the claim that a fair reason relating to 
the operational requirements of a business permits an employer engaged in bargaining to 
throw the dismissal lever if its entire package is not accepted.  The reason for this should 
be obvious: it is an expedient open to abuse, and its ready availability would undermine 
the institution of collective bargaining, the bearer of so many key aspirations of the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA).”
 argues: 
 
67
                                                 
64  Van Niekerk and Linstrom Unfair Dismissal 3rd ed (2006) 36. 
65  Van Niekerk and Linstrom Unfair Dismissal 37. 
66  “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals” (2006) 27 ILJ 704. 
67  “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals” at 710. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CASE LAW PERTAINING TO DISMISSALS WITHIN THE CONTEXT 
OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
 
 
3 1 BACKGROUND 
 
Section 187(1)(c) effectively renders dismissal within the context of a lock-out unlawful.  The 
great difficulty concerning this section is its practical application when it comes to proposed 
changes relating to terms and conditions of employment.  Whilst this section prohibits 
dismissal of employees for refusing to accept a demand of an employer in respect of a matter 
of mutual interest, an employer is permitted to dismiss employees of genuine operational 
requirements.68
“Interest disputes are intended to be resolved in the collective bargaining arena.  
Allowing an employer to undermine this process by unilaterally exercising the power to 
dismiss in order to compel an employee to accept a demand, would be in breach of s 
187(1)(c) and would constitute an automatically unfair dismissal.  Nevertheless, the wide 
scope of ‘mutual interest’ disputes encompasses proposed changes to terms and 
conditions of employment as part of a business restructuring exercise.
 
 
Proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment fall within the sphere of mutual 
interest which are normally resolved through collective bargaining using power play tactics 
like lock-outs.  However, the very same proposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment fall within the category of operational requirements which are classified as 
dispute of rights where an employer is permitted to retrench or dismiss.  This results in a 
situation where the demarcation of the routes that are followed for rights and interest disputes 
becomes blurred.  This paradoxical situation was captured by Tamara Cohen in “Dismissals to 
Enforce Changes to Terms and Conditions of Employment - Automatically Unfair or 
Operationally Justifiable” this way: 
 
69
                                                 
68  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
69  Cohen “Dismissals to Enforce Changes to Terms and Conditions of Employment - Automatically Unfair 
or Operationally Justifiable” (2004) 25 ILJ 1883. 
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Notwithstanding the clear demarcation of interest and rights disputes and their respective 
dispute-resolution forums, such disputes by their very nature fall within the ambit of s 
189.” 
 
The challenge that has faced the courts when dealing with dismissals that arise from the 
context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment is to determine the point 
at which an employer’s desire to introduce changes through resorting to dismissal moves 
away from being an attempt to compel employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of 
mutual interest to being a genuine and fair dismissal justifiable on operational grounds.  
 
According to Du Toit70
“The question that has confronted the courts is whether section 187(1)(c) should be 
narrowly interpreted as applying only to dismissals that are ‘truly designed to make 
employees change their minds in a dispute with an employer on matters of mutual interest 
- in other words, dismissals that are conditional in the sense that they will be reversed if 
the employees accept the employer’s demand - or whether it should also apply to the 
unconditional dismissal of employees who reject an employer’s demand in a matter of 
mutual interest.”
 the challenge that faces the courts in this regard can be summed up 
this way: 
 
71
This is the point at which the Labour and the Labour Appeal Courts have differed greatly.  
The Labour Court, on quite a number of instances held that the prohibition of dismissal as a 
way of compelling employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest 
applies to both conditional and unconditional dismissals.
 
 
72  On the other hand, the Labour 
Appeal Court has held that the prohibition on dismissal only applies to conditional 
dismissals.73
When confronted with a dispute over dismissals where employees refused to accept changes 
to terms and conditions of employment, the Labour Court was quick to classify the dismissals 
as emanating from the collective bargaining process where dismissal is not a legitimate 
instrument of exerting pressure on employees.  Consequently such dismissals were held to fall 
 
 
3 2 THE LABOUR COURT  
 
                                                 
70  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch and Rossouw Labour Relations Law 5th ed 
(2006) at 390. 
71  Du Toit et alLabour Relations Law at 390. 
72  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC). 
73  Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa of South Africa (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
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squarely within the ambit of section 187(1)(c), thereby rendering them automatically unfair.  
The court made it clear that the employer should have made use of options like a like lock-out 
instead of dismissal. 
 
3 2 1 NUMSA v FRY’S METALS (PTY) LTD 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s Metals74
“Dismissal is not a legitimate instrument of coercion in the collective bargaining process.  
The change in the definition of a lock-out means that even the temporary and tactical 
dismissal is precluded.  Section 187 (1) (c) renders any dismissal to compel acceptance of 
an employment demand automatically unfair, ...  Wage-work deals must be the products 
of methods stopping short of the dismissal spectre.”
 the employer wanted to 
introduce a new shift system and also to do away with transport subsidy.  Upon failing to 
persuade the employees to accept the proposed change in the shift system, the company 
wanted to retrench the employees on the grounds of operational requirements.  The union on 
the other hand, contended that the dismissals were mainly aimed at compelling the employees 
to accept the employer’s demand and therefore automatically unfair. 
 
Firstly, the court classified the dispute about the proposed change in the shift system as a 
classical mutual interest disputes that is resolved through the collective bargaining process 
where dismissal is not permitted.  The court also emphasized that by resorting to dismissing 
the employees who refused to agree to its demands, the employer had attempted to avoid 
using legitimate collective bargaining mechanisms like conciliation and lock-out.  When 
ruling that the employer had wrongly used dismissal within the context of collective 
bargaining the court remarked: 
 
75
Moreover, the court held that the employer had used the threat of dismissing the employees 
when it reached the point of impasse in the negotiations about the proposed change in the shift 
  (my emphasis) 
 
It can therefore be deduced that the use of the phrase “any dismissal” is indicative of the fact 
that from the court’s perspective, any dismissal that is meant to compel employees to accept a 
demand, whether conditional or unconditional falls squarely within the ambit of section 
187(1)(c). 
 
                                                 
74  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC). 
75  NUMSA v Fry’s Metals (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC) at para 38. 
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system.  Prior to reaching the impasse, the employer had made no intention of its desire to 
dismiss the employees.  It was clear then, the court held, that the employer had used the threat 
of dismissal as a “negative inducement to employees to abandon their reluctance to accept the 
new shift system”.76
The court by holding that the dispute and the subsequent negotiations about the proposed 
change in the shift system fell within the “wage-work bargain” where dismissal is not 
permissible, endorsed Thompson’s
 
 
77 view that such disputes “not be allowed to escape the 
protected zone of collective bargaining”.  Most importantly, the court commented that 
allowing employers to resort to dismissals within the context of collective bargaining, thereby 
avoiding other mechanisms acceptable in the collective bargaining process, would be 
tantamount to undermining one of the primary objects of the 1995 Labour Relations Act, to 
promote orderly collective bargaining.78
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Zeuna Starker Bop (Pty) Ltd
 
 
3 2 2 NUMSA v ZEUNA-STARKER BOP (PTY) LTD 
 
79
One of the interesting dimensions of the dispute was that in the notice of retrenchment, the 
employer made it clear that it would re-employ the employees if they accepted its wage offer.  
Therefore, the dismissals were conditional and aimed at compelling the employees to accept 
 the 
employer dismissed employees after they had rejected its final wage offer, citing operational 
requirements as the reason.  Interestingly, the employer first embarked on the lock-out route, a 
weapon fully acceptable in the collective bargaining process but later abandoned it and 
resorted to dismissing the employees who rejected its final wage offer. 
 
The court ruled that the company was not justified to use dismissal as a way of compelling 
employees to accept its wage offer.  The dispute was a dispute of interest respect of a matter 
of mutual interest between the employer and the employee.  It had to be resolved within the 
domain of collective bargaining where weapons like a lock-out are permissible, and not 
dismissal. 
 
                                                 
76  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC) at para 51. 
77  “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements Dismissal” at 755-766. 
78  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC) at para 59.4. 
79  (2002) 23 ILJ 2283 (LC). 
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the employer’s demand.  Consequently, the dismissal fell within section 187(1)(c) and was 
therefore automatically unfair. 
 
Having declared the dismissal unfair, the court ordered the re-instatement of the dismissed 
employees even though it acknowledged that the re-instatement would lead to retrenchment of 
other permanent employees.80  In line with the sentiment expressed in CEPPWAWU v Glass 
& Aluminium 2000 CC81
In National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union v Hernic Premier Refractories 
(Pty) Ltd
 that an automatically unfair dismissals has to be dealt with in a 
manner that “gives due weight to its seriousness”, the court ordered reinstatement dating back 
to 43 months and compensation up to 24 months. 
 
3 2 3 NCBAWU v HERNIC PREMIER REFRACTORIES (PTY) LTD 
 
82
The court held that the dispute was one that fell within the dispute of interest domain which 
had to be resolved through the collective bargaining by using mechanisms like negotiations.  
The court reiterated the notion expressed in NUMSA v Fry’s Metals
 the employer proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment as a way 
of restructuring its business.  After failing to secure acceptance of its proposed changes it 
embarked on a retrenchment exercise on the grounds of operational requirements.  
 
83 that dismissal is not a 
legitimate weapon of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in a matter of 
mutual interest.  Interestingly, whilst acknowledging that the employer was experiencing 
financial losses amounting to approximately R4 000 000 per month (therefore having a valid 
operational requirement reason to retrench) the court still found that the dismissal was 
motivated by a desire to compel employees to accept the employer’s demand.84
                                                 
80  (2002) 23 ILJ 2283 (LC). 
81  (2002) 23 ILJ 695 (LAC). 
82  (2003) 24 ILJ 837 (LC). 
83  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC). 
84  (2003) 24 ILJ 837 (LC) at para 28. 
  This shows 
that the mere presence of a valid operational reason for dismissal does not automatically mean 
that the dismissal falls outside the scope of section 187(1)(c). 
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3 2 4 FAWU v GENERAL FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD 
 
In Food & Allied Workers Union v General Food Industries Ltd85
“When however the court is confronted with a situation where it is alleged that an interest 
(i.e. non-legal claim) dispute has migrated from the protected collective bargaining zone 
to the rights or justiciable (legally based claim) zone by a process of manipulation, then 
the solutions or answers become less clear-cut.  Although the definitions of ‘rights’ 
(which concerns a legal claim) and ‘interest’ (a claim for something new) disputes are 
fairly well-established), it is sometimes not easy to apply them to the facts of a particular 
case.  This is such a case.”
 the court had to deal with a 
situation where the employer after having concluded a wage increase (albeit under duress and 
for fear of a strike action) with a union, embarked on a retrenchment exercise a month later.  
The question that the court had to address was whether an employer could use retrenchment 
or outsourcing to achieve what it had failed to attain through the collective bargaining 
process, namely to reduce or freeze the wage increase.  Also, the court had to consider a 
situation of where a dispute of interest in the form of a dispute about wage increase had 
moved away from the protected zone of collective bargaining where dismissal is precluded to 
the zone of disputes of right where dismissal is permissible. 
 
In addressing these questions the court first acknowledged that the demarcation line between 
interest disputes and rights dispute is not always clear-cut, particularly when a dispute has 
moved away from the zone of collective bargaining where power-play is the norm to the 
sphere of disputes of rights dispute.  In this case the dispute had shifted from being a dispute 
about wage increase to whether it was permissible for the employer to embark on outsourcing 
as a way of undoing the effects of the wage agreement that it had concluded under duress, 
mainly because of the fear of industrial action.  This had resulted in a situation where there 
was some kind of an overlapping of issues.  The court explained this overlapping in this way: 
 
86
Basing its argument on Thompson’s assertion in “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the 
Operational Requirements Dismissal”
 
 
87
                                                 
85  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC). 
86  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC) at para 13. 
87  (1999) 20 ILJ 755 at 755-6. 
 that in disputes that are “purely over the wage 
bargain” dismissal should not be permitted, the court ruled that since the dispute revolved 
around a wage increase which the company had consented to through a collective agreement, 
the dispute was a “classic interest dispute” and dismissal was not permissible.  Whilst 
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acknowledging that the company had a right to embark on outsourcing, the court held that in 
this case the company had used outsourcing as a tool to undermine the collective bargaining 
process through which the collective agreement on the six percent increase had been 
concluded.  Making shrift of the company’s argument that it had concluded the wage increase 
agreement, which it claimed was not affordable, under pressure and for fear of industrial 
action, the court argued this way: 
 
“The company was frustrated by the ‘inherited’ centralized bargaining structure, but 
participated fully and actively in the collective bargaining process.  An outcome was 
agreed, albeit under threat of industrial action.  That is the very essence of collective 
bargaining- the use of power to extract a favourable outcome.”88
“When a party elects to resolve a dispute by adopting a particular (collective bargaining) 
route, this court must hold that party to the bargain unless that party can show that a 
deviation is justified by exceptional circumstances.”
 (my emphasis) 
 
Most importantly, in a serious effort to preserve the sanctity of collective bargaining and 
discourage the practice of parties first attempting to resolve disputes through the collective 
bargaining process and upon failing to achieve a desired outcome then resorting to tactics like 
dismissal, the court emphatically stated that such a situation should be vigorously 
discouraged.  The court asserted: 
 
89
“In this case, the company used outsourcing as a device for undermining the status of the 
wage agreement concluded on 14 October 1999), and as a device for undermining the 
status of the union as the exclusive recognized collective bargaining agent of the 
dismissed employees.”
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the court held that the dismissals were primarily meant to undermine the 
collective agreement on the wage increase.  The company had decided to use outsourcing as a 
ploy to obtain the reduction in wages that it had failed to achieve in the collective bargaining 
process.  The court held: 
 
90
                                                 
88  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC) at para 29. 
89  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC) at para 31. 
90  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC) at para 37. 
 
 
Consequently, the dismissals were held to be automatically unfair as they fell within the ambit 
of section 187(1)(c). 
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3 3 A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LABOUR COURT’S APPROACH 
 
From the cases discussed , it appears that when confronted with a dismissal emanating from 
the collective bargaining context, the Labour Court was guided by one of the primary objects 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, namely to promote orderly collective bargaining.91
Firstly, the Labour Court paid particular attention to the dichotomy of dispute of interest and 
dispute of right and the route that each dispute was supposed to follow.  Upon identifying the 
nature of the dispute, the court then outlined the route that the dispute had to follow.  
Admittedly, there are situations where this dichotomy of disputes of rights and dispute of 
interest becomes blurred.  This the court did acknowledge in Food & Allied Workers Union v 
General Food Industries.
  
The decisions of the court were meant to ensure that the sanctity of the collective bargaining 
process was preserved through ensuring that employers are precluded from resorting to 
dismissal upon failing to secure a desired outcome in the process of negotiations.  The court’s 
intention seems to prevent a situation where upon reaching an impasse in the negotiation 
process, the employers could easily resort to dismissal or better still retrenchment under the 
guise of operational requirements, whilst in actual fact the main intention was to compel 
employees to accept a demand in a matter of mutual interest. 
 
92
“Section 187(1)(c) renders any dismissal to compel acceptance of an employment 
demand automatically unfair, …”
  However, this did not distract the court from classifying the 
dispute in an appropriate way and consequently prescribing the correct route to be followed in 
resolving that dispute in that particular case. 
 
Secondly, the court also adopted a purposive approach in interpreting section 187(1)(c).  The 
court interpreted the section to apply to all dismissals (whether conditional ie subject to being 
withdrawn upon acceptance of an employer’s demand or unconditional) that arose from the 
collective bargaining context or to be specific from proposed changes to terms and conditions 
of employment.  This was categorically stated in NUMSA v Fry’s Metals where the court held 
that: 
 
93
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93  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC) at para 38. 
 
 
 33 
Whether an employer claimed that a dismissal was necessitated by operational requirements 
and not aimed at compelling an employee to accept a demand, the court scrutinized the nature 
of the dispute and whether it arose from the sphere of matters of mutual interest, where 
dismissal is prohibited. 
 
Moreover, in National Construction Building & Allied Workers Union v Hernic Premier 
Refractories94 the court made a very important observation that in a dismissal case, the mere 
existence of a valid operational reason does not guarantee a dismissal immunity from section 
187(1)(c) or being found to be automatically unfair.  This observation was later on echoed by 
the Labour Appeal Court in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd.95
Most importantly, in Food & Allied Workers Union v General Food Industries
 
 
96
“When a party elects to resolve a dispute by adopting a particular (collective bargaining) 
route, this court must hold that party to the bargain, unless that party can show that a 
deviation is justified by exceptional circumstances.”
 the court 
emphasized the principle that parties engaged in the collective bargaining process should not 
be allowed to manipulate the process by opting to move out of it through characterizing a 
dispute as a dispute of right instead of a dispute of right when the going gets tough.  This 
would prevent a situation where an employer would first embark on negotiations about 
introducing changes to terms and conditions of employment and upon the negotiations 
reaching an impasse, the employer would raise the spectre of dismissal on operational 
grounds as a way of exerting pressure on employees instead of using accepted collective 
bargaining mechanisms like a lock-out.  The court emphasized this principle in this way: 
 
97
In conclusion, the Labour Court in its decisions sought to protect employees from being 
dismissed in disputes that arose from the context of proposed changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment.  The court also prevented the employers from using dismissal 
under the guise of retrenchment as a subtle way of compelling employees to accept an 
employer’s demand in respect of matters of mutual interest.  It restored the sanctity of the 
collective bargaining process through outlawing dismissals in the process and instead 
emphasizing the importance of using acceptable mechanisms of power-play like negotiations 
 
 
                                                 
94  (2003) 24 ILJ 837 (LC). 
95  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
96  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC). 
97  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC) at para 31. 
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and the lock-out.  In essence, it protected employees against being bullied by employers 
through using threats of dismissal as a way of inducing agreement in the collective bargaining 
process.  In this way, the court gave effect to the express intention of section 187(1)(c) 
namely to do away with the dismissal lock-out.  Most importantly, in Food & Allied Workers 
Union v General Food Industries98
                                                 
98  (2002) 23 ILJ 1808 (LC). 
 the court sought to prevent a situation where an employer 
could dismiss employees for operational reasons after concluding an agreement that it 
considered unsustainable.  Collective agreements are an essential element of the collective 
bargaining process.  To allow employers to escape from collective agreements that they 
conclude on the grounds of operational requirements dismissal would undermine the very 
purpose of the collective bargaining process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE KEY AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
4 1 FRY’S METALS (PTY) LTD v NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS OF 
SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The Labour Court’s finding in NUMSA v Fry’s Metals99 that section 187(1)(c) applies to all 
dismissals (whether conditional or unconditional) that arise from the context of proposed 
changes to terms and conditions of employment was rejected by the Labour Appeal Court.  
On appeal, the court in Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa100
                                                 
99  (2001) 22 ILJ 701 (LC). 
100  (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
 clearly stated that section 187(1)(c) only applies to dismissals that are subject to 
being withdrawn by the employer upon the employees’ acceptance of the employer’s demand.  
A dismissal is final and not subject to being withdrawn falls outside the ambit of the section.  
According to the court, a dismissal contemplated by section 187(1)(c) is temporary because it 
is subject to being withdrawn when employees accept the employer’s demand because  its 
main aim is not really to dismiss the employees but instead to induce them to comply with the 
employer’s demand.  On the other hand, a dismissal that is effected for operational 
requirements in terms of section 188(1)(a)(ii) is permanent and its intention is to replace 
workers who are not prepared to work under the terms and conditions of employment 
demanded by the operational requirements of the business with those willing to do so. 
 
4 1 1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SECTION 187 (1) (c) 
 
In answering the question of whether an employer has a right to dismiss employees who 
refuse to accept changes to their terms and conditions of employment when such changes are 
necessary for the viability of the employer’s enterprise and whether there is a link between 
such a dismissal and that contemplated by section 187(1)(c), Zondo JP first examined the 
historical background of section 187(1)(c). 
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He argued that section 187(1)(c) was intended to do away with the concept of a dismissal 
lock-out as encapsulated in the definition of a lock-out in terms of the 1956 Labour Relations 
Act.101  In terms of that definition of the lock-out an employer was permitted to dismiss 
employees as a way of inducing them to accept a demand.  However, the dismissal had to be 
conditional and coupled with an offer of re-employment should the employees accept the 
demand.  Such dismissals, for example in CWIU v Indian Ocean Fertilizer102
Dismissals that were final and not accompanied by an offer of re-employment upon 
acceptance of employer’s demand fell outside the ambit of the lock-out and were held to be 
unfair.  Such was the case in Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union v Game Discount 
World Ltd
 were held to be 
fair.  
 
103 and National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aerial King Sales (Pty) 
Ltd.104
“In order to fall within the ambit of s 187(1)(c) a dismissal must have as its purpose the 
compulsion of the employees concerned  to accept a demand in respect of a matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee.”
 
 
In essence section 187(1)(c) only seeks to outlaw conditional dismissals that have a purpose 
of compelling employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest.  A 
dismissal that is unconditional falls outside the scope of this section.  This was emphatically 
expressed this way: 
 
105
“A dismissal that is final cannot serve the purpose of compelling the dismissed 
employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest between employer 
and employee because, after he has been dismissed finally, no employment relationship 
remains between the two.  An employee’s acceptance of an employer’s demand in respect 
of a matter of mutual interest can only be useful or worth anything if the employee is 
going to continue in the employer’s employ.  Let us say that an employer wants his 
employees to agree that a transport subsidy be done away with. If the employees accept 
this demand and continue in the employer’s employ, that would serve a useful purpose.  
 
 
To further illustrate that the section was mainly aimed at curbing conditional dismissal the 
court stressed that: 
 
                                                 
101  S 1(d)(i)-(ii). 
102  (1991) 12 ILJ 822 (IC). 
103  (1990) 11 ILJ 162 (IC). 
104  (1994) 15 ILJ 1384 (IC). 
105  Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2003) (LAC) at para 27. 
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However, if the employees are dismissed finally and irrevocably, their agreement that the 
employer may do away with the transport subsidy is irrelevant.  The people whose 
agreement matters are those who are going to be in his employ.106
“... I conclude that there is a distinction between a dismissal for a reason based on 
operational requirements and a dismissal the purpose of which is to compel an employee 
to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest between employer and 
employee.  The distinction relates to whether the dismissal is effected in order to compel 
the employees to agree to the employer’s demand which would result in the dismissal 
being withdrawn and the employees being retained if they accept the demand or whether 
it is effected finally so that, in a case such as this one, the employer may replace the 
 
 
It is therefore clear that according to the court, section 187(1)(c) strictly applied to dismissals 
that are conditional and accompanied by an offer of re-employment upon acceptance of an 
employer’s demand.  Dismissals that are final in the sense that they are not accompanied by 
an offer of re-employment fall outside the scope of this section. 
 
4 1 2 THE TENSION BETWEEN SECTION 187(1)(c) AND SECTION 188(1)(a)(ii) 
 
Having applied the literal approach of confining the interpretation of confining the meaning of 
section 187(1)(c) only to dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of re-employment, the 
court went on to hold that there was no tension between section 187(1)(c) and section 
188(1)(a)(ii). 
 
Basing its argument on the premise that a dismissal that falls within section 187(1)(c) is a 
dismissal that is conditional and subject to being withdrawn when the employees accept an 
employer’s demand by virtue of the fact that its real purpose is not to dismiss them but to 
compel employees to accept an employer’s demand, the court held that a dismissal that is 
based on operational requirements has a different purpose.  Its purpose is to replace 
permanently the employees who are unwilling to work under the proposed changes to the 
terms and conditions which are necessary for the viability of an enterprise with employees 
who are willing to work under the changed terms and conditions of employment.  This is what 
makes a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept a demand in respect of a 
matter of mutual interest different from that based on operational requirements.  The court 
made this observation: 
 
                                                 
106  Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa at para 28. 
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employees permanently with employees who are prepared to work under the terms and 
conditions that meet the employer’s requirements”.107
                                                 
107  Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa at para 31. 
 
 
In short, the approach that the court adopted in relation to the apparent tension between the 
two sections was to completely overlook the fact that in both instances it is the employer’s 
desire to effect changes to the terms and conditions of employment that eventually gives rise 
to the dismissal.  For the court, the defining point is the purpose behind the dismissal.  A 
dismissal as contemplated by section 187(1)(c) is accompanied by an offer of reinstatement if 
the employees accept an employer’s demand and this indicates that the real intention of the 
employer is to induce acceptance of his demand.  On the other hand, in operational 
requirements dismissal the dismissal is permanent and the aim is to permanently replace the 
employees who are not prepared to work under the changed terms with those willing to do so. 
 
The problem with this reasoning is that the line separating a dismissal that is intended to 
compel employees to accept a demand from that necessitated by operational requirements is a 
very fine one.  Both have a link with matters of mutual interest, namely proposed changes to 
terms and conditions of employment which are normally resolved through collective 
bargaining and where dismissal is not permitted.  Also, both emanate in essence from the 
refusal by employees to accept the proposed changes to their terms and conditions of 
employment.  That this did not preoccupy the court is somewhat puzzling.  All that the court 
preoccupied itself with was whether the dismissal was coupled with an offer of re-
employment and if it did it fell within the ambit of section 187(1)(c) and was consequently 
automatically unfair. 
 
4 1 3 REJECTION OF THOMPSON’S SUGGESTION OF NOT PERMITTING 
“FOR PROFIT” RETRENCHMENTS 
 
Disputes about proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment fall within the 
sphere of matters of mutual interest.  Matters of mutual interest give rise to disputes of rights 
which are normally resolved through collective bargaining.  However, situations may arise 
where a dispute of interest may change and become a dispute of right.  This was aptly stated 
in Food & Allied Workers Union v General Food Industries Ltd  (albeit in a strike context): 
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“That is not to say that a dispute of interest may not, for example, in the case of a strike, 
metamorphose into a dispute of rights. For example, when the economic survival of an 
enterprise is threatened by a strike, it may be justifiable to use retrenchment 
procedures.”108
Thompson in “Bargaining, Business Restructuring and the Operational Requirements 
Dismissal”
 
 
This can also apply to the context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment.  A dispute about the changes may start off as a matter of mutual interest and 
accordingly a dispute interest but may overlap and fall within the domain of operational 
requirements thereby giving rise to disputes of right.  
 
109
Unfortunately, this view of confining operational requirements dismissals in the context of 
proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment was rejected by the court as having 
no statutory basis because the Labour Relations Act of 1995 does not distinguish between an 
 acknowledged the complex situation that disputes about proposed changes to 
terms and conditions have the potential to change from being a matter of mutual interest 
giving rise to dispute of interest issue to being a dispute of right issue.  As a way of trying to 
resolve this predicament and reconciling the tension between section 187(1)(c) which forbids 
use of dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept a demand in respect of a 
matter of mutual interest, and section 188(1)(a)(ii) which permits employers to dismiss an 
employee for operational reasons, he suggested  that in cases directly linked to the collective 
bargaining process where dismissal is prohibited, dismissals on operational grounds should 
only be allowed in limited circumstances. 
 
In instances where the enterprise only intends making profits, dismissal on operational 
grounds should not be allowed because much as making profits is an operational reason it is 
not as compelling as in a situation where the very survival of a business is threatened.  Such a 
dismissal should fall within section 187(1)(c).  Dismissal should only be allowed in cases 
where the survival of the business is threatened.  In essence, the suggestion was a means of 
protecting the sanctity of collective bargaining as a protected zone where dismissal is not 
permitted and only allowing resort to dismissal in exceptional cases such as when the very 
survival of a business is threatened. 
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employer’s right to dismiss for a reason based on operational requirements “in the context of a 
business” the survival of which is under threat and a business which is making profit and 
wants to make more profit.110
The Supreme Court of Appeal
 
 
111
“The core difficulty with this argument is that the dichotomy between matters of mutual 
interest and questions of ‘right’ do not in our view form the basis of the collective 
bargaining structure that the statute has adopted.  The unavoidable complexities that arise 
from the supposed ‘migration’ of issues from matters of mutual interest to matters of 
‘right’ demonstrate in our view that the dichotomy does not form the basis of the 
statutory structure, and s 187(1)(c) cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as if the legislation 
proceeds from that premise.”
 on the same dispute took matters a step further by arguing 
that the complexity that arises as a result of disputes moving away from the domain of 
collective bargaining where dismissal is not allowed in resolving matters of mutual interest to 
the zone of rights dispute where dismissal is permitted, emanates from the dichotomy between 
matters of mutual interest and matters of right.  For the court such a complexity need not arise 
because the dichotomy of rights and interests disputes on which such a complexity seems to 
emanate from, has no legal basis.  In holding that such a dichotomy has no statutory basis, the 
court argued: 
 
112
In Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd
 
 
This argument is quite puzzling, because the effective resolution of disputes in terms of 
whether they should be classified as belonging to the collective bargaining arena or the 
adjudication or arbitration terrain largely relies on this dichotomy.  In dealing with disputes 
relating to unfair labour practices, the courts in particular, the Labour Appeal Court have also 
made use of this dichotomy.  In terms of this finding such a reliance was grossly misplaced. 
 
4 2 CHEMICAL WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION v ALGORAX (PTY) LTD 
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 the court had to deal with a 
dispute that emanated from an employer’s decision to introduce a new shift system on the 
basis of operational requirements.  The circumstances were very similar to those of Fry’s 
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Metals v NUMSA.114
“Counsel for the respondent submitted that, where an employer has valid operational 
requirements to address, a dismissal cannot be one effected for the purpose of compelling 
the employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest.  I do not 
agree.  Where, for example, an employer seeks to reduce costs in his business and 
demands that his employees agree to work short-time, that employer has genuine 
operational requirements justifying the working of short-time but, without the employee’s 
consent, he is not entitled to require them to work short-time.  He can demand that they 
work short-time but they are not under any obligation to comply with his demand.  If they 
are not prepared to work short-time and refuse to do so, a dispute may then arise between 
the parties on whether the employees should work overtime.  That is a dispute of 
interest.”
  The only difference between the two cases was that in Algorax the 
employer coupled the dismissal with an offer of re-employment if the employees accepted the 
shift system.  The court leaning heavily on the Fry’s Metals decision held that the offer of 
reemployment clearly showed that the dismissals were not intended to be final and therefore 
not based on operational requirements but merely aimed at compelling the employees to 
accept the employer’s demand.  This rendered the dismissal automatically unfair since it fell 
squarely within the ambit of section 187(1)(c). 
 
One of the interesting aspects about the Algorax case was that the court did acknowledge that 
the employer had a valid operational requirement.  However, the fact that the dismissal was 
accompanied by an offer of re-employment meant that the real purpose behind the dismissal 
was to compel employees to accept its demand and not really necessitated by operational 
requirements.  The court indicated that the mere existence of valid operational requirements 
did not mean that a dismissal would automatically fall outside the ambit of section 187(1)(c).  
Also, that the difference between a dismissal that is based on operational requirements and 
that intended to compel acceptance of an employer’s demand is quite uneasy to explain was 
shown this way: 
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From the above it can be deduced that the employer would not be allowed to resort to 
dismissal because the dispute is a matter of mutual interest that has to be resolved through 
collective bargaining. 
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However, the court went on to say: 
 
“Such an employer may then dismiss the employees for operational requirements in order 
to get rid of them permanently and employ a new workforce that will be prepared to work 
in accordance with the needs of his business.  In such a case the employer will be 
dismissing the old workforce because the contracts of employment he has with them can 
no longer properly serve his operational requirements.”116
“I think that an examination of the evidence in this matter reveals that, while on the one 
hand, there are indications that the purpose of the dismissal was to compel the employees 
to agree to the employer’s demand, on the other hand, there are also indications that the 
purpose of the dismissal was to get rid of the employees permanently.”
 
 
This clearly indicates that the extent to which a dismissal that is automatically unfair is 
ascertained largely depends on how the employer has couched the notice of dismissal.  If the 
employees have been dismissed permanently, the dismissal is fair.  If it is conditional then it 
is automatically unfair.  This reliance on the purpose of the dismissal as a defining device to 
separate the two dismissals fails to appreciate the reality that both dismissals flow from the 
same context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment and the subsequent 
refusal by employees to accept them. 
 
Lastly, the complexity of sifting evidence that supports a contention that a dismissal is based 
on operational requirements from that which lends credence to the fact a dismissal is intended 
to compel employees to accept his demand was illustrated in the same case this way: 
 
117
If there was indication of an intention to dismiss the employee “permanently”, a purpose that 
was held to be the key to distinguishing a dismissal based on operational requirements from 
the one intended to compel acceptance of a demand in Fry’s Metals v National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa
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 then to rule that the dismissal was automatically unfair had 
an element of unfairness.  This indicates the inadequacy of the yardstick of ascertaining 
whether a dismissal is permanent or conditional to determine if it falls within section 
187(1)(c) and its potentially grossly unfair consequences. 
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4 3 MAZISTA TILES (PTY) LTD v NATIONAL UNION OF MINE WORKERS 
 
In Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers119
“The employer was not requiring its employees to work differently; it was demanding 
that they relinquish their jobs and submit sooner or later to a new and hugely prejudicial 
from [sic] of dependent and contingent labour.”
 the employer amongst other 
things proposed the closure of the hostel where employees were residing, discontinuation of 
the feeding scheme and most importantly wanted employees to be converted to independent 
contractors who would be self-employed or make the employees to work at a reduced basic 
wage and an “incentive based system” that would be based on productivity.  The employees 
showed willingness to accept the proposal concerning the closure of the hostel and abolition 
of the feeding scheme.  They rejected the proposal of becoming independent contractors or 
“incentive” employees.  This is not surprising, given the fact that in relation to employment 
security the prospects of independent contractors are less appealing than those of an 
employee.  The employer then dismissed the employees on operational grounds.  The court 
ruled that because the dismissals were final and irrevocable, they fell outside the ambit of 
section 187(1)(c). 
 
Once more, the delicate task of balancing two competing interests involving an employer’s 
right to run a business prosperously and the employee’s right to employment security was put 
to test.  In this case the proposal was not just aimed at inducing the employees to work in a 
different way but to give up their very employment status.  This unusual situation was clearly 
expressed by Thompson this way: 
 
120
“While the normal rule would be that an employer is free to wrest any outcome it can via 
the rigours of collective bargaining, such an extraordinary outcome was being proposed 
here that perhaps on request it should not have escaped the gaze of the judges even if an 
agreement had been extracted.”
 
 
The employer’s proposal struck at the core of the employee’s employment security.  Its wish 
to convert employees to become independent contractors was a matter of mutual interest 
which should have at best been left to the collective bargaining process.  Thompson makes 
this observation: 
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What can be deduced from this case is that the employer had proposed a package of change to 
terms and conditions of employment.  This package included closure of a hostel, abolition of 
the feeding scheme as well as converting employees to the independent contractor status.  The 
employees were willing to accept a portion of the package, namely the abolition of the 
feeding scheme and closure of the hostel but were not willing to accept the independent 
contractor status.  They were dismissed for that and the court held that the dismissal was fair.  
For the court, the defining moment was that the employer had shown that the dismissal was 
permanent and that.  That the proposal had potentially devastating consequences for the 
employees in the sense that they had to surrender their very status of employment in the 
interest of the employer’s operational requirements and the court should have gone further 
than just relying on the “permanent-conditional dismissal” test.  It is against this background 
that Thompson argues for a much stricter test: 
 
“… when parties are engaged in economic bargaining, one of them should not be allowed 
to pull the plug on the process by threatening the demise of the other if it does not get its 
way.  The courts should look especially critically at the claim that a fair reason relating to 
the operational requirements of a business permits an employer engaged in bargaining to 
throw the dismissal lever if it entire package is not accepted”.122
Firstly, one of the interesting things about the Labour Appeal Court’s decision in Fry’s Metals 
v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
 
 
4 4  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT AND 
SUPREME COURT APPEAL APPROACH 
4 4 1 THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT 
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 was the acceptance by the court of the 
employer’s argument that the retrenchments were purely based on operational requirements 
and not intended to compel the employees to accept the employer’s proposed new shift 
system.  Then court went on to state that there is a distinction between a dismissal 
contemplated by section 187(1)(c) and that based on section 188(1)(a)(ii).  When ascertaining 
the true nature of an issue in dispute, one of the useful devices is the correspondence between 
parties.  The notice of retrenchment that was served by the employer to the employees 
vindicates the assertion that a dismissal that arises from the context of proposed changes to 
terms and conditions of employment is very difficult to clearly categorize as being motivated 
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purely by operational requirements instead of being intended to compel employees to accept 
those changes, thereby falling within section 187(1)(c). 
 
Despite the fact that the dismissal was said to be motivated by operational requirements and 
not intended to force the employees to accept the employer’s demand, part of the notice of 
retrenchment served to the employees, read as follows: 
 
“Please note that the [appellant] does not want to retrench you and will retain [you] in its 
employ provided that you agree to work the shift system.” 
 
From this it can be inferred that whilst the employer argued that the retrenchment was 
motivated by operational requirements, the notice simultaneously indicated that the purpose 
behind the dismissal was to secure employees’ agreement to accept the new shift system.  
That the court decided to downplay this important dimension is puzzling. 
 
Secondly, whilst the Labour Court ruled that section 187(1)(c) should be read widely to give 
protection against threats of dismissal whether conditional or permanent when proposed 
changes to terms and conditions of employment are in dispute, the Labour Appeal Court has 
adopted a literal and narrow approach of interpreting the section to only apply to conditional 
dismissals that are coupled with an offer of re-instatement of the employees upon acceptance 
of the employer’s demand  This has the potential of encouraging employers, when resorting to 
dismissal within the collective bargaining context, to adopt a hard-line stance during 
negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment by making it absolutely 
clear in their correspondence with the employees or their representatives that the dismissals 
are final and irrevocable, so as to  escape with ease, the harsh consequences of the dismissals 
being found to be automatically unfair.  This does not augur well for a healthy industrial 
relations environment.  Also, it is worth noting that acceptable power-play mechanisms like 
lock-outs do not always bring immediate results for employers in the collective bargaining 
process.  Traditionally, dismissal, whether temporary or permanent, has been regarded as 
being impermissible as a tool of compulsion in the collective bargaining process.  The finding 
that only conditional dismissal is precluded, may tempt employers to raise the possibility of 
dismissals when an impasse is reached in the bargaining process.  The threat of dismissal, 
especially in an environment where unemployment is rife may be more successful than other 
weapons permissible in collective bargaining.  This would unfairly tilt the scales in favour of 
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employers during negotiations as the threat of dismissal, often referred to as “capital 
punishment” for employees would loom large.  
 
Thirdly, the Appeal Court’s decision threatens the very foundation of collective bargaining.  
Negotiations during the collective bargaining process often results in an impasse.  As a way of 
getting out of the impasse, parties are permitted to use their power as a way of persuading the 
other side to agree to its demands.  Employers have recourse to lock-out whilst employees can 
go on strike. 
 
Permitting employers to use permanent dismissal within the collective bargaining context has 
the potential of leaving employees somehow vulnerable in the collective bargaining process.  
Mischke in “Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment - The Return of The 
Automatically Unfair Dismissal”124
“The upshot of the Fry’s Metals decision was to leave the door ajar for the employer, if 
no agreement could not be reached with the employees or their representatives, the 
employer could dismiss for operational requirements in terms of s 189 in order to rid 
itself of its recalcitrant employees to make way for others who would do the work as the 
employer required.”
 lamented this unfortunate situation: 
 
125
Moreover, when interpreting the scope of section 187(1)(c) the court made reference to the 
fact that section’s origin could be traced to the 1956 Labour Relations Act’s definition of the 
lock-out.  That definition permitted the use of conditional dismissal as a tool of compulsion 
during the collective bargaining process.  In this regard, the court also based the core of its 
argument on the CCAWUSA v Game Discount World
 
 
126
“That dismissal was, and was intended to be final and irrevocable.  The individual 
applicants were not dismissed to compel or induce them to accept respondent’s demand.  
The fact that the notice to the employees was for that purpose, does not assist the 
 case where the it was held that a 
permanent dismissal fell outside the ambit of the lock-out as contemplated by the 1956 
Labour Relations Act.  What is worth noting is that in that case, the court emphatically 
declared the use of permanent or final dismissal as being unfair within the context of 
collective bargaining.  The court had this to say: 
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respondent.  The termination should have been for that purpose …  The dismissals were 
therefore unlawful …  An employee is not obliged to accept changes in conditions of 
employment.  It is manifestly unfair to dismiss him because he refuses to accept such 
changes.”127
It may well be said that by permitting the use of conditional dismissal and outlawing final 
dismissal in the collective bargaining process, the 1956 Labour Relations Act had a more 
positive influence for labour relations because to a certain degree the preservation of the 
employment relationship was paramount.  A conditional dismissal was deemed to be fair and 
functional to collective bargaining since it had the desire of resuscitating the employment 
relationship.  A permanent dismissal, which did not have the potential of reviving the 
employment relationship was held to be unfair.  On the other hand the interpretation that 
permanent dismissals fall outside the scope of section 187(1)(c) fails to appreciate the 
importance of the preservation of the employment relationship.  In essence, it results in the 
anomalous situation where an employer who, in the context of proposed changes to terms and 
conditions of employment bargaining, indicates that he is permanently dismissing employees 
who are refusing to accept his demand is not guilty of any wrongdoing whilst an employer 
who in the same context shows some form of empathy by indicating that dismissals will be 
withdrawn if employees change their minds and accept his demands, is committing a cardinal 
sin of an automatically unfair dismissal.  This was the case in Chemical Workers Industrial 
Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd
 
 
In line with the intention of the lock-out in terms of the 1956 Labour Relations Act, only 
temporary dismissals constituted a fair bargaining mechanism.  The Appeal Court’s decision 
failed to appreciate the context within which the finding that permanent dismissal falls outside 
the lock-out definition was made.  To declare that permanent dismissals fall outside the scope 
of section 187(1)(c) negates the very purpose that the section sought to achieve, namely to 
outlaw the use of dismissal as a mechanism of pressurizing employees in the context of 
collective bargaining. 
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 where the employer dismissed employees who refused to accept 
a new shift system (similar to Fry’s Metals v NUMSA) but still indicated that he was prepare 
to take the employees back if they accepted the changed shift system.  By offering to reinstate 
the employees if they agreed to his demand, the employer had committed a fatal mistake as 
the court held that this indicated that the dismissal was motivated by the desire to compel the 
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employees to accept a demand in respect of a matter of mutual interest.  This rendered the 
dismissal automatically unfair despite the court’s acknowledgement that the employer had 
valid operational requirement to introduce the shift system. 
 
Furthermore, the Appeal Court’s decision has had far-reaching consequences when it comes 
to security of employment for employees.  It is widely accepted that employees have to expect 
their terms and conditions of employment to be changed in order to fit with the operational 
requirements of a business.  In Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mine Workers129
Moreover, the interpretation of section 187(1)(c) as only applying to conditional dismissals 
has the potential to undermine one of the core tenets of the collective bargaining process, the 
collective agreements.  On the basis of this interpretation, a shrewd employer can conclude 
what he may consider an unsustainable collective agreement with a trade union, on a wage 
increase, for instance, and then walk away from that agreement by dismissing the employees 
for operational requirements to achieve what he couldn’t during negotiations.  As long as the 
employer makes it a point that the dismissals are final, the dismissals will not be regarded as 
being automatically unfair.  In General Food Industries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers 
Union
 
the employer wanted to change employees to become independent contractors.  The employer 
was in this case not just demanding that the employees perform work differently but was 
instead requiring them to sacrifice their jobs and opt for an insecure form of labour.  The court 
held that by dismissing finally and irrevocably the employees who had refused to accept his 
demand, the employer was fully justified on operational grounds.  This is surely contrary to 
one of the purposes of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 which is to advance social justice. 
 
130
In addition, one of the unfortunate consequences of the adulterated meaning attached to 
section 187(1)(c) by the court is that the prospects of  employees or their representatives 
successfully relying on that section when challenging a dismissal that arises out of the context 
of proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment are very slim. This interpretation 
 the employer concluded a wage increase agreement, which it argued was not 
affordable, with its employees and six months later embarked on retrenchments.  The court 
held that the retrenchments were fair and not intended to undermine the collective agreement 
(about wage increase). 
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has emasculated section 187(1)(c). With the court having declared that permanent dismissals 
within the context of changes to terms and conditions of employment are permissible if they 
are informed by operational requirements in terms of section 189 of the 1995 Labour 
Relations Act, employees would be well advised to complement their challenge to the 
dismissal on the grounds of section 187(1)(c) with a challenge that is based on unfairness in 
terms of section 189. 
 
When interrogating a dismissal based on section 189 the courts are more vigilant as was 
evidenced by the remarks of the court in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax: 
 
“When either the Labour Court or this court is seized with a dispute about the fairness of 
a dismissal, it has to determine the fairness of the dismissal objectively.  The question 
whether the dismissal was fair or not must be answered by the court.  The court must not 
defer to the employer for the purpose of answering that question. In other words it cannot 
say that the employer thinks it is fair, it is or should be fair.”131
By presenting a twin challenge based on section 187(1)(c) and also on section 189 the 
dismissed employees were able to achieve a better result in the Algorax case, unlike in Fry’s 
Metals v NUMSA
 
 
132
In conclusion, the assertion that section 187(1)(c) only applies to dismissals that are 
conditional and not to permanent dismissals is not conducive to a healthy collective 
bargaining environment.  Thompson in “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of 
the Spheres after Fry’s Metals”
 where the challenge on dismissal was solely based on section 187(1)(c) 
and the court did not therefore examine whether indeed the employer properly considered 
alternatives to the dismissal, as prescribed by section 189. 
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 cautions that this forces employers to take drastic action by 
effecting final and irrevocable dismissals rather than conditional dismissals when bargaining 
about proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment.  This interpretation which 
comes down hard on employers who even by the slightest of imaginations indicate 
preparedness to reinstate employees has even led to a situation where the termination lock-out 
that was permissible under the 1956 Labour Relations Act is seen as being much preferable 
when compared to section 187(1)(c).  Todd and Damant in “Unfair Dismissal - Operational 
Requirements” express this perspective succinctly: 
 50 
 
“We have considerable difficulty understanding why the legislature should seek to 
protect workers by outlawing the lock-out dismissal.  It may readily be contended that a 
lock-out dismissal is preferable by a considerable margin (from the point of view of 
workers) to a ‘final’ dismissal in the same circumstances.  Fry’s Metals and Algorax 
aptly demonstrate that the prohibition may have the effect of subverting conventional 
notions of what is fair in the context of an operational requirements dismissal, in 
particular that every effort should be made before, during or even after the dismissal to 
secure alternative employment for the dismissed workers.”134
“It seems somewhat strange that the legislature should have categorized conditional 
dismissals in the context of collective bargaining as automatically unfair, but excluded 
final dismissals occurring in the same context.  It is also debatable whether the legislature 
intended to allow employers to terminate collective bargaining over employer-initiated 
proposals by finally and irrevocably dismissing the employees.”
 
 
The anomaly that flows from this narrow interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c) is 
aptly put by Grogan: 
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“The Fry’s Metals judgment raises difficult issues in the intersect between collective 
bargaining and unfair dismissal. It does seem anomalous that an employer is protected 
against the consequences of exercising the power to dismiss when it need demonstrate 
little more than that it intended to treat the dismissals as final. It has been suggested that 
this power enables employers to undermine the institution of collective bargaining by 
resorting to dismissal as a weapon when it is unable to achieve its demands through the 
collective bargaining, effectively converting what is a dispute of interest into a dispute of 
right. It is perhaps even more anomalous that a ‘temporary’ dismissal (which assumes a 
reinstatement once the underlying dispute is resolved) should be visited with a penalty of 
24 months’ remuneration, while a ‘permanent dismissal, however unfair it may be, 
attracts the less maximum penalty of 12 months’ remuneration.”
 
 
Van Niekerk comments on the absurdity of this interpretation this way: 
 
136
The fear that employers can easily undermine the process of collective agreement by resorting 
to dismissal when unable to achieve their demands through the collective bargaining process, 
thereby effectively converting what is a dispute of interest into a dispute of right, stems from 
the verdict in General Food Industries Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union.
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  It can be 
said that the court’s argument that the retrenchments that the company embarked on after 
concluding a wage increase agreement with the employees (albeit for fear of industrial action) 
had been raised even before the agreement was struck and were therefore not intended to 
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undermine the agreement itself, does hold weight.  However, the possibility of employers 
engaging in collective bargaining and then resorting to dismissal when unable to achieve their 
demands is high.  To overcome the hurdle of automatically unfair dismissals, all that they 
have to do is to ensure that the dismissals are permanent. 
 
Cohen138
One of the interesting aspects of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s upholding of the Labour 
Appeal Court’s verdict in Fry’s Metals v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
 noting that a well-advised employer could circumvent the provisions of s 187(1)(c) 
by refraining from making an offer of reinstatement argues that this anomaly could have been 
avoided if the Labour Appeal Court had adopted a purposive interpretation which reflected 
the legislature’s rejection of the use of dismissal as a pressure tactic to influence the outcome 
of an interest dispute. 
 
4 4 2 THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL 
 
139
This dichotomy has also been extensively used by the courts, in particular the Labour Appeal 
Court when dealing with disputes concerning unfair labour practice in relation to provision of 
benefits.  For instance, in Hospersa v Northern Cape Provincial Administration
 
was the outright rejection of the dichotomy between matters of mutual interest and matters of 
right.  The court stated categorically that such a dichotomy has no statutory basis.  This 
dichotomy has been helpful in explaining whether a particular dispute should be resolved 
through arbitration or adjudication, or should be resolved through collective bargaining.  
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“A dispute of interest should be dealt with in terms of the collective bargaining structures 
and is therefore not arbitrable.  A dispute of interest should not be allowed to be 
arbitrated … under the pretext that it is a dispute of right.  To do so … would inevitably 
be a fundamental subversion of the collective bargaining process itself.  If individuals can 
properly secure orders that have the effect of determining the evaluation of differing 
interests on the merits thereof, then the distinction between disputes of interest and 
disputes of right would be distorted and the collective bargaining process self-evidently 
would become undermined.”
 where the 
dispute revolved around the issue of an acting allowance the court observed: 
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Also, in Gauteng Provinsiale Administrasie v Scheepers142
“Generally speaking a dispute relating to proposals for the creation of new rights or the 
diminution of existing rights is a dispute of mutual interest.  Such disputes are ordinarily 
to be resolved by collective bargaining …”
 the court referred to the dichotomy 
this way: 
 
143
“Rights disputes are those arising from breaches of rights or failure to discharge duties 
expressly conferred or imposed by the Act or other statutes, by collective agreement or 
by individual contracts of service; they are justiciable in terms of the LRA by either 
arbitration or adjudication.  All other disputes are matters of interest (therefore non-
justiciable and of necessity to be resolved by industrial action).  The Act terms these 
‘matters of mutual interest’.”
 
 
Furthermore, this distinction between matters of mutual interest and matters of right has been 
extensively referred to by legal writers in the process of explaining certain concepts.  For 
instance, Grogan in Workplace Law makes reference to the dichotomy in this way: 
 
144
“Since unfair labour practices are disputes of right rather than interest, a dispute over 
benefits must amount to a dispute of right in order to be classified as an unfair labour 
practice.”
 
 
In Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide when explaining the importance of the 
rights-interests dichotomy when dealing with the concept of unfair labour practice in relation 
to benefits , Du Toit  puts it this way: 
 
145
“Broadly speaking, disputes of right concern the infringement, application or 
interpretation of existing rights embodied in a contract of employment, collective 
agreement, or statute, while disputes of interest (or ‘economic disputes’) concern the 
creation of fresh rights, such as higher wages, modification of existing collective 
agreements, etc.  Collective bargaining, mediation, peaceful industrial action, are 
generally regarded as the most appropriate avenues for the settlement of conflicts of 
interests, while adjudication is normally regarded as an appropriate method of resolving 
disputes of right.”
 
 
Also, in A Guide to South African Labour Law Rycroft and Jordaan explain the distinction 
this way: 
 
146
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The dichotomy of matters of mutual interest and matters of right plays a very important role 
in determining the appropriate route that disputes must follow for effective.  It also plays an 
important role in the resolution of unfair labour practices relating to benefits, for instance.  It 
is rather puzzling why the Supreme Court of Appeal denied the existence of such a notion. 
 
Thompson147 is spot-on when he avers that it is somewhat baffling why the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was dismissive of the rights-interest dichotomy because the solution that the Labour 
Appeal Court adopted when interpreting the meaning of section 187(1)(c) in Fry’s Metals v 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa148
“A good appreciation of the rights-interests distinction is indispensable in characterizing 
and then dealing with disputes in the context of s 186(2)(a), which brands as an unfair 
labour practice ‘unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, 
probation … or training of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an 
employee’.”
 did not require a denial of the distinction 
between matters of mutual interest and matters of right.  He emphasizes the importance of the 
distinction in relation to disputes relating to unfair labour practice this way: 
 
149
In conclusion, the rejection of the rights-interest dichotomy is not helpful for effective 
resolution of labour disputes.  Up to the point that this dichotomy was deemed to be non-
existent, strictly speaking, it was relatively easy to categorize disputes in terms of whether 
they were of interest or right matters and consequently determine the route the followed for 
resolution.  This also helped the courts when dealing with unfair labour practice disputes over 
provision of benefits.  It is absolutely important that the courts should guard against bringing 
notions that have no potential of contributing positively to the effective resolution of labour 
disputes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 is to advance, amongst other things, 
economic development and social justice.150
“…  But bargaining also takes time, often a lot of time, and again there is no guarantee 
that this method of changing terms and conditions of employment will have the required 
effect.  Collective bargaining can be delayed or deadlock reached, leaving the employer 
potentially in a worse situation than it started off with.  In theory of course, the employer 
may contemplate exercising economic power in the form of a lock-out- hardly the most 
appropriate course of action for an employer already facing considerable economic 
pressure.  The resulting loss of production and the fall-out of a lock-out may very well 
constitute the last straw for a struggling employer.  Because the employer needs to move 
quickly, dismissal comes to mind as an alternative: if all else fails, the threat of dismissal 
or the reality of a dismissal may be the most appropriate method of placing pressure on 
the employees and their trade union to accede to the employer’s demands for changes to 
  This requires that a balance be struck between 
safeguarding the employer’s right to run his business prosperously and the employee’s right 
to employment security.  Whilst it is fair to preclude dismissal as a way of compelling 
employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the 
employer and the employee, it is also fair to acknowledge that an employer does have a right 
to dismiss employees whose terms and conditions of employment do not meet his operational 
requirements.  Competitive market forces demand that employers respond by changing the 
terms and conditions of employment.  If they fail to do so, the possibility of their enterprise 
facing financial ruin is quite high.  At the same time to give employers unrestricted latitude 
through permitting them to dismiss employees on operational grounds, in relation to changing 
terms and conditions of employment, would be greatly prejudicial to employees and would 
not be good for collective bargaining. 
 
The options that employers have in terms of effecting changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment, namely negotiating with the employees and the lock-out are not always 
effective.  This is what makes employers find it hard to resist the temptation of evading the 
collective bargaining and instead resorting to dismissal. Mischke illustrates this: 
 
                                                 
150  S 1. 
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the terms and conditions of employment. If for example, the employees do not agree to a 
new shift system, different ways of working overtime, standby allowances or other 
issues, the threat of dismissal and subsequent unemployment may succeed where other 
methods of persuasion have failed.”151
The confinement of section 187(1)(c) to conditional dismissals has resulted in anomalous 
situations where within the context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment, the mere fact that a dismissal is permanent suffices to exonerate it from being 
automatically unfair whilst that which is coupled with an offer of re-employment does not.  
Given the harsh sanctions that flow from an automatically unfair dismissal, in the context of 
proposed changes, it is quite logical to argue that meting out the severe sanctions to an 
employer whose only wrongdoing is indicating that he is prepared to take the dismissed 
employees back if they accept his demands whilst exonerating the employee who 
categorically indicates that the dismissal is permanent, is highly unfair.  It is against this 
background that Thompson
 
 
The interpretation of section 187(1)(c) by the courts and its anomalous consequences has 
resulted in a need to come up with some options that may be beneficial to both employers and 
employees and most importantly, to preserve the sanctity of collective bargaining. 
 
5 1 REMOVAL OF SECTION 187(1)(c) FROM THE CATEGORY OF 
AUTOMATICALLY UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
 
152
“Option one could be to remove the prohibition of against tactical and temporary 
dismissals from the category of automatically unfair dismissals.  It simply does not 
belong there and spawns anomalies.  In fact, it probably does not belong anywhere else 
either.  The shoulders of s 188(1)(a)(ii) are broad enough to deal with the fairness of all 
dismissals in the operational requirements context, and strong enough to give all 
dismissals that subvert the bargaining process, whether temporary or permanent, their 
proper due.”
 suggests that section 187(1)(c) should be removed from the 
category of automatically unfair dismissals.  He reasons: 
 
153
By their very nature, operational requirements dismissals are “no fault dismissal” on the 
employee’s part.  Stringent conditions must be satisfied before a dismissal based on 
operational requirements can be declared to be fair.  Section 189 gives effect to this notion by 
expecting employers to amongst other things to consider alternative measures to avoid the 
 
 
                                                 
151  Mischke “Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment - The Return of the Automatically Unfair 
Dismissal” at 32. 
152  “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals”. 
153  Thompson “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals” at 730. 
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dismissals.  For instance, section 189A(19) (applicable to large scale retrenchments) stipulates 
the following conditions that must be met for a dismissal that is based on operational 
requirements: 
 
• The dismissal must be effected to give effect to a requirement based on the employer’s 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs. 
 
• The dismissal must be operationally justifiable on rational grounds. 
 
• There must be proper consideration of alternatives. 
 
• Selection criteria must be fair. 
 
It has to be said that when it comes to probing the fairness of operational requirements, the 
court are quite vigilant.  Mischke attests to this sentiment this way: 
 
“The days in which the Court hesitated to rush headlong into an evaluation of the 
employer’s business decision are long gone.  No such judicial reticence now prevails.  It 
has been replaced by an avid judicial scrutiny and attention to the details of the 
employer’s business reasoning and decision-making.”154
Concerning the role of the courts when probing dismissals based on operational requirements, 
in BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU
 
 
155
In Chemical Industrial Workers Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd
 the court had this to say: 
 
“The word ‘fair’ introduces a comparator, that is a reason which must be fair to both 
parties affected by the decision.  The starting point is whether there is a commercial 
rationale for the decision.  But, rather than take such a justification at face value, a court 
is entitled to examine whether the particular decision has been taken in a manner which is 
also fair to the affected party, namely the employees to be retrenched.  To this extent the 
court is entitled to enquire as to whether a reasonable basis exists on which the decision, 
including the proposed manner, to dismiss for operational requirements is predicated.  
Viewed accordingly, the test becomes less deferential and the court is entitled to examine 
the content of the reasons given by the employer, albeit that the enquiry is not directed to 
whether the reason offered is the one which would have been chosen by the court.  
Fairness, not correctness is the mandated test.” 
 
156
                                                 
154  “Changing Terms and Conditions of Employment.  The Return of the Automatically Unfair Dismissal” at 
36. 
155  (2001) 7 BLLR 705 at para 19. 
 the court held: 
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“Sometimes it is said that a court should not be critical of the solution that an employer 
has decided to employ in order to resolve a problem in its business because it normally 
will not have the business knowledge or expertise which the employer as a 
businessperson may have to deal with problems in the workplace.  This is true.  However, 
it is not absolute and should not be taken too far.  When either the Labour Court or this 
court is seized with a dispute about the fairness of a dismissal, it has to determine the 
fairness of the dismissal objectively.  The question whether the dismissal was fair or not 
must be answered by the court.  The court must not defer to the employer for the purpose 
of answering that question.  In other words it cannot say that the employer thinks it is 
fair, and therefore, it is or should be fair.” 
 
To further bolster the argument that the courts are quite interrogative and considerate of the 
plight of employees when dealing with an unfair dismissal based on operational requirements, 
it is important to note that in some cases the court has even gone to the point of saying that 
dismissal should be the last resort.  
 
For instance, in General Food Industries Ltd v Food & Allied Workers Union157
Also, in Chemical Industrial Workers Union v Algorax
 the court 
held: 
 
“After consultations have been exhausted the employer must decide whether to proceed 
with the retrenchments or not.  The loss of jobs through retrenchment has such a 
deleterious impact on the life of workers and their families that it is imperative that - even 
though reasons to retrench employees may exist - they will only be accepted as valid if 
the employer can show that all viable alternative steps have been considered and taken to 
prevent the retrenchments or to limit these to a minimum.” 
 
158
In short, the removal of the dismissal intended to compel employees to accept an employer’s 
demand from the category of automatically unfair dismissals would not leave employees 
without protection.  Dismissals emanating from operational requirements are scrutinized by 
the courts and a dismissal that is disguised as an operational requirement one whilst it is not, 
 the court had this to say: 
 
“It seems to me that the reason for the lawmaker to require all of these things from the 
employer was to place an obligation on the employer only to resort to dismissing 
employees for operational requirements as a measure of last resort. If that is correct, the 
court is entitled to intervene where it is clear certain measures could have been taken to 
address the problems without dismissals for operational reasons or where it is clear that 
dismissal was not resorted to as a measure of last resort.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
156  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at para 69. 
157  (2004) 25 ILJ 1260 (LAC) at para 55. 
158  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) at para 70. 
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will not pass muster easily.  Therefore, the anomalies brought about by the narrow 
interpretation of section 187(1)(c), namely that it only covers conditional dismissals and 
exonerates permanent dismissals, which makes it somewhat easy for employers to evade the 
collective bargaining process, would be obviated. 
 
5 2 USE OF THE “CAUSATION” TEST 
 
It is not easy to distinguish within the context of proposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements from one that is 
intended to compel employees in respect of a matter of mutual interest.  Reliance on whether 
the dismissal is final or conditional is simply not the best option.  It is very easy to meet that 
condition.  It also has the potential of negating collective bargaining through giving 
employers a leeway of moving away from the bargaining process through resorting to 
dismissal on the basis of operational requirements.  As a way of closing the gaps created by 
the operational requirements ground of dismissal, Cohen159 argues for the use of the 
“causation test” when examining, within the context of proposed changes to terms and 
conditions of employment, whether a dismissal is based on operational requirements or is 
aimed at compelling employees to accede to an employer’s demand.  This test was used in 
South African Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd160
• The factual causation 
 where employees had embarked on a 
protected strike and the employer dismissed them on the grounds of operational requirements.  
The question that the court had to answer was whether the employees were dismissed because 
of their participation in the strike or because of genuine operational requirements.  Using the 
causation test, the court arrived at the conclusion that the employees were not dismissed for 
their participation in the strike, but for operational requirements. 
 
The test has two legs: 
 
• The legal causation 
 
                                                 
159  “Dismissals to Enforce Changes to Terms and Conditions of Employment - Automatically Unfair or 
Operationally Justifiable” 1883. 
160  (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
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(a) The factual causation 
 
In terms of the factual causation leg, the question that has to be asked is whether the 
employees would have been dismissed if the employer had not attempted to introduce changes 
to their terms and conditions of employment.  If the answer is that the dismissals would have 
taken place even if the employer had not proposed changes to the terms and conditions of 
employment, then the dismissal would not be automatically unfair. 
 
If the answer is that that the dismissal would not have taken place if the employer had not 
proposed the changes, this does not immediately render the dismissal automatically unfair.  
The enquiry moves to the next stage, the legal causation. 
 
(b) The legal causation 
 
In the legal causation leg, the enquiry is whether the proposed changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment were the “main” or “dominant” reason behind the dismissal.  The 
answer to the enquiry depends on the purpose of the change and the reason behind the 
dismissal.  If from the enquiry it cannot be inferred that the dismissal was intended to compel 
employees to accept the employer’s demand, the next stage should be to bring in section 189 
to ascertain whether the dismissal was effected for a fair reason based on operational 
requirements also whether a fair procedure was followed. 
 
Given the tough interrogation that dismissals based on operational requirements are exposed 
to by the courts, section 189 serves as a reliable tool that can be used to distinguish a 
dismissal genuinely based on operational requirements from that which is meant to secure 
employee’s compliance with a demand. 
 
In conclusion, the use of the causation test would be very helpful in establishing the real 
purpose behind a dismissal.  It would also obviate an unfortunate situation like in Chemical 
Industrial Workers Union v Algorax161
                                                 
161  (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). 
 where, despite the court’s admission that the employer 
had a valid operational requirement to dismiss, the dismissal was found to be automatically 
unfair merely because the employer had indicated willingness to re-employ the dismissed 
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employees if they accepted his demand.  The causation test would have established the main 
or proximate reason behind the dismissal and certainly the offer of re-employment would not 
have been the main indicator that the dismissal was automatically unfair. 
 
5 3 USE OF REPLACEMENT LABOUR IN EMPLOYER-INITIATED LOCK-
OUTS 
 
One of the tools that an employer is legally permitted to use in compelling employees to 
accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the 
employee is the lock-out.  Within the context of proposing changes to employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment, an employer is legally entitled to use the lock-out as a mechanism 
of compulsion.  Courts have consistently emphasized this.  In CCAWUSA v Game Discount 
World Ltd162
Also, in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics (Pty) Ltd
 the court said: 
 
“An employee is not obliged to accept changes in conditions of employment.  It is 
manifestly unfair to dismiss him because he refuses to accept such changes.  The Act 
provides a means of compulsion, namely lock-outs.” 
 
163
One of the factors that make the lock-out to be ineffective, particularly when it comes to 
compelling employees to accept proposed changes to their terms and conditions of 
 the lawfulness of a lock-out as a 
weapon of compulsion was reiterated: 
 
“An employer needs the flexibility to deploy, reasonably, quickly and efficiently, the 
resources at the employer’s disposal.  Options are open to an employer to achieve this.  
One of them is the lock-out route which is used to compel acceptance of a demand.  It is 
recognized that in a collective bargaining situation (and I would add in an individual 
bargaining situation) an employer may bargain and exercise economic power against 
employees.” 
 
Despite the ready availability of the lock-out as a means of compelling employees to accept a 
demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the employee, it 
is its ineffectiveness that makes it to be less appealing to employers.  This is what makes 
dismissal a tempting option to employers. 
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employment emanates from the issue of replacement labour.  The use of replacement labour 
within the lock-out context is regulated by section 76 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.  
 
Section 76(1)(b) reads thus: 
 
“An employer may not take into employment any person - … for the purpose of 
performing the work of any employee who is locked out, unless the lock-out is in 
response to a strike.”164
“A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee acts 
contrary to section 5 or if the reason for the dismissal is - … that the employee refused, or 
indicated an intention to refuse, to do any work normally done by an employee who at the 
time was taking part in a strike that complies with the provisions of Chapter IV or was 
locked out, unless that work is necessary to prevent an actual danger to life, personal 
safety or health.”
 
 
In terms of this section if there is a dispute about changes to terms and conditions of 
employment, an employer who initiates a lock-out before the employees have embarked on a 
strike, will not be entitled to engage replacement labour.  This could have serious implications 
because production could virtually come to a halt if the majority or all the employees are 
locked out.  Even if not all the workers are locked out, the options of the employer in terms of 
relying on the employees who are not locked out are limited.  Unless the employees who are 
not locked out show willingness to do the work of the locked out employees, the employer 
cannot compel them through dismissal. 
 
Section 187(1)(b) reads as follows: 
 
165
These constraints in relation to the use of replacement labour, makes the lock-out to be least 
attractive.  Compounding matters is also the fact that an employer is not allowed to 
unilaterally introduce changes to the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.  He 
has to obtain their consent or resort to the lock-out option.  Given the harsh sanctions that 
await an employer who dismisses employees who refuse to perform the work of employees 
who are locked out, it would be foolhardy for an employer to take such a step as a way of 
ensuring that production is not hampered by the lock-out.  Cases where work is necessary to 
prevent an actual danger to life, personal safety or health (where the employer is permitted to 
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dismiss an employee who refuses to perform the work of an employee who is locked out) are 
few and far between.  It is a combination of these factors that makes dismissal an attractive 
option for employers. 
 
Todd and Damant in “Unfair Dismissal - Operational Requirements”166
However, appealing as the dismissal option may be to employers, it is also has its own 
problems.  Needless to say, for employees dismissal is the worst form of punishment.  For 
employers, dismissals can also be costly. Todd and Damant
 illustrate the 
unintended consequences of the prohibition of replacement labour in employee-initiated lock-
outs: 
 
“The employer’s ability to use the lock-out as a means of compulsion at the point of 
impasse has been severely curtailed by the prohibition on the use of replacement labour 
in employer initiated lock-outs.  It could be argued that dismissal would, in the 
circumstances under discussion, not be justifiable for long as the employer could 
reasonably be expected to engage temporary alternative labour in place of the existing 
workforce.  The employer could be expected to continue with the power-play rather than 
dismiss for as long as it could reasonably continue its business by using replacement 
labour. But the prohibition on the use of replacement labour in employer initiated lock-
outs has the effect that an employer may find itself more quickly at the point where it is 
operationally and commercially justifiable on rational grounds to jettison the existing 
recalcitrant workforce and go to the cost and effort of replacing it and training a new 
workforce, rather than continuing to hold out with the existing workforce at the point of 
impasse.” 
 
167
The prohibition of use of replacement labour emasculates the lock-out option as a bargaining 
mechanism.  This leads to the unfortunate situation which compels employers to resort to 
dismissal on operational grounds.  Dismissal is costly for the employees as they lose their 
source of livelihood.  It also has expensive consequences for some employers as they have to 
 point this out: 
 
“Where it is operationally and commercially justifiably on rational grounds to do so, an 
employer may choose to dismiss in these circumstances provided its intention in doing so 
is clearly to replace those workers who refuse to accept the workplace changes 
demanded, and is not to attempt to force compliance with its demands.  Of course 
replacing a workforce is unlikely to be an attractive option for most employers.  The loss 
of accumulated skills and the cost of recruitment and training are likely to have a material 
impact on the business.  And the employer may be obliged to pay severance benefits to 
the retrenched workforce.” 
 
                                                 
166  At 919. 
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contend with costs associated with recruiting and training the new employees who replace 
those dismissed. 
 
Permitting the use of replacement labour in employer initiated lock-outs would make the lock-
out option attractive to the employers.  They would be able to exert pressure on employees 
using the lock-out but with production uninterrupted through the use of replacement labour.  
Admittedly, this would not be good news for employees, but when compared to dismissal, the 
use of replacement labour may not be the best option but certainly it would not be the worst 
option either.  It is for this reason that Todd and Damant168
In conclusion, the prohibition on the use of replacement labour in employer initiated lock-outs 
serve no useful purpose in collective bargaining within the context of proposing changes to 
the terms and conditions of employment.  It emasculates the lock-out, a bargaining 
mechanism that is legally available to the employer, to a point where it becomes so ineffective 
that the employer feels justified in resorting to dismissal which may actually yield the desired 
results.  Whilst it is intended to protect the employees’ bargaining position in the collective 
bargaining process, it leaves the very employees it seeks to protect, vulnerable to dismissal.  
That dismissal is detrimental to the welfare of employees cannot be disputed.  It is also 
undeniable that for some if not most employers, dismissals can result in costs in the form of 
recruitment and training costs.  Indeed, dismissal is not conducive to a healthy industrial 
relations environment.  It is also worth noting that for an employer who is faced with rampant 
market forces that demand alterations to the employees’ terms and conditions of employment 
,concerns about a healthy industrial relations climate, potential costs of dismissal, effects of 
the dismissal  on the employee, may eventually give way to the employer’s operational 
 argue: 
 
“It would be more sensible, in our view, for the legislature to permit the use of 
replacement labour in employer initiated lock-outs.  This would make it more difficult for 
employers to argue that they have reached the point of dismissal before they have 
exhausted attempts at resolving the issue through industrial action.  The prohibition on 
the lock-out dismissal would then have greater effect.  The employer can only dismiss 
once it has reached the point in the collective bargaining process when its operational 
requirements justify replacing the workforce altogether, with all the cost and 
inconvenience that this entails to the employer.  Where power-play offers a realistic 
possibility of achieving that result, employers will be more likely to pursue that option 
rather than resorting to dismissal.  And dismissal may be less easy to characterize as 
commercially justifiable on rational grounds when the lock-out option has not been 
exhausted.” 
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requirements considerations which may be best served by changing the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.  Whilst having recourse to a lock-out option (that for all intents 
and purpose is ineffective because of the prohibition on use of replacement labour), the 
employer may find solace in the dismissal for operational requirements option.  Unpalatable 
as the use of replacement labour is for employees who are locked out or involved in a strike, 
when one looks at the bigger picture, permitting the use of replacement labour would be much 
better for the collective bargaining process.  It would result in a robust but at the same time 
relatively fair power-play exercise.  It would to a certain extent take dismissal out of the 
equation. It is against this background that it is ideally necessary to permit the use of 
replacement labour in employer initiated lock-outs.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Competitive market forces often compel employers to propose changes to the employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment.  Employers are not permitted to unilaterally introduce 
such change.  Consent of employees has to be obtained.  The employer has to negotiate with 
the employees.  This is where collective bargaining fits in.  It is not very often that employees 
will appreciate the need for a change to their terms and conditions of employment.  If 
negotiations fail to produce the desired result for the employer, then the question is what 
options can the employer rely on to induce the employees to accept the need for the change to 
their terms and conditions of employment. 
 
The employer can make use of the lock-out option.  However, if he initiates the lock-out, he is 
not entitled to the use of replacement labour.  The 1995 Labour Relations Act is very clear on 
that.169
The next question is whether the employer can use dismissal as a way of pressurizing the 
employees to accept his demand.  Dismissal is not permissible in disputes revolving around 
matters of mutual interest.  Dismissals are not a legitimate instrument of coercion in the 
collective bargaining process.
  The lock-out may take a very long time if the employees do not capitulate.  At the 
same time, production would have come to a halt.  This in a way shows that the lock-out 
option may fail to produce positive results for the employer. 
 
170
                                                 
169  S 76(1)(b). 
170  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd at para 38. 
  Under the 1956 Labour Relations Act, an employer, was 
permitted within the context of a lock-out to dismiss employees as a way of compelling them 
to accept a demand.  However such dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of re-
employment upon acceptance of the demand.  The 1995 Labour Relations Act does not offer 
such an option.  Use of dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an 
employer’s demand is strictly prohibited.  Section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
gives effect to this notion by stating that a dismissal that is intended to compel an employee to 
accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the 
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employee, is automatically unfair.  Therefore, if the employee resorts to dismissal, the 
dismissal will be automatically unfair. 
 
An employer is allowed to dismiss employees on the grounds of operational requirements, 
provided that he follows a fair procedure.171
The fact that in both cases the dismissal is precipitated by the need to effect changes to terms 
and conditions and fully aware of the intention of section 187(1)(c) to outlaw dismissal as a 
bargaining mechanism.  It is not surprising that Cheadle
  Proposed changes to terms and conditions of 
employment fall within the range of mutual interest where use of dismissal is not permissible.  
However, the very terms and conditions of employment can become matters of right.  In 
essence, the employees’ terms and conditions of employment must be responsive to the 
operational needs of the employer’s business.  If they are not the employer is allowed to 
dismiss those employees on the grounds of operational requirements. 
 
It is this intersection between matters of mutual interest and matters of right that gives rise to 
the problem of how to determine within the context of collective bargaining and in relation to 
effecting changes to employees, terms and conditions of employment to be specific, whether a 
dismissal is intended to compel employees to accept an employer’s demand (thereby falling 
squarely within section 187(1)(c) or is genuinely based on operational requirements). 
 
172
The Labour Appeal Court
 observed: 
 
“Section 187(1)(c) makes the classic lock-out dismissal automatically unfair.  An 
employer may no longer dismiss employees to compel them to accept new terms and 
conditions of employment.  But how different is that from dismissing an employee on the 
grounds of operational requirements because the employer needs to change a terms or 
condition of employment and the employee refuse to agree to it?” 
 
The difficulty in distinguishing a dismissal that is based on operational requirements from that 
whose intention is to compel employees to accept an employer’s demand has resulted in an 
examination of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). 
 
173 as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal174
                                                 
171  S 188(1)(a)(ii). 
172  Current Labour Law at 26. 
173  Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
 have ruled that the 
only dismissal that section 187(1)(c) targeted was a conditional dismissal that is subject to 
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being withdrawn upon the employees’ acceptance of an employer’s demand.  This offer is 
said to be indicative of the real purpose of the dismissal, namely to compel the employees to 
accept a demand.  Dismissals that are final and not coupled with any offer of reemployment 
are not automatically unfair.  In essence, section 187(1)(c) was only intended to remove the 
option of resorting to a dismissal lock-out  as an acceptable bargaining tool of the employer in 
terms of the 1956 Labour Relations Act, according to the superior courts.  Within the context 
of collective bargaining only those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of 
reemployment are automatically unfair.  To be precise, permanent dismissals are a genuine 
indicator of the purpose of dismissing for operational requirements. 
 
The test that says that when ascertaining the real purpose behind a dismissal, regard should be 
had to whether the dismissal is permanent or conditional is not satisfactory.  It has the 
potential of treating differently employers who for all intents and purposes dismissed 
employees for the same reason, to effect changes to terms and conditions of employment 
because of operational requirements but only differed when it came to couching the dismissal 
as being final and irrevocable or conditional.  In Fry’s Metals v National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa175 the dismissal was held to be fair because they were final and 
thus indicative of a genuine operational requirement, and thus fair.  In Chemical Industrial 
Workers Union v Algorax,176
Todd and Damant
 despite the court’s concession that the employer did have a valid 
operational requirement to dismiss, the dismissal was held to have been effected for the 
purpose of compelling employees to accept a demand and therefore automatically unfair. 
 
177
That this is the purpose of a dismissal may be indicated by the employer’s express words 
to this effect, or by its conduct in, for example, indicating its willingness to re-employ 
those of the dismissed workers who subsequently agree to accept the demand, …  
However, it must be said that these are far from reliable indicators of the employer’s 
 have this to say: 
 
“What is prohibited by s 187(1)(c) is a dismissal whose purpose is to compel acceptance 
of an employer’s collective bargaining demand.  This removes the ability of an employer 
to have recourse to a particular form of power-play that was frequently used prior to 
1995: the termination of contracts of employment and simultaneous offer of re-
employment on changed terms and conditions where the purpose is to compel acceptance 
of those terms and conditions. 
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purpose.  An employer may as a matter of good faith indicate that despite the dismissal it 
will re-employ workers who change their mind for as long as it has not been able to 
replace them with new permanent employees. It would hardly be fair to conclude that this 
taints the employer’s real objective, which is to find a replacement workforce willing to 
work on the new terms.” 
 
The implications of the meaning of section 187(1)(c) as interpreted by the superior courts are 
far-reaching.  They leave an impression that the courts never really understood the real 
intention of the section.  The true intention of section 187(1)(c) was to outlaw the use of any 
form of dismissal, both conditional or permanent, as a bargaining tool.  It would be surprising 
to claim that this section only sought to outlaw those dismissals that were coupled with an 
offer of re-employment and exonerate those that are permanent.  Conditional dismissals, by 
their nature seek to revive the employment relationship and are in a way functional to 
collective bargaining.  Permanent dismissals do not show any willingness to revive the 
employment relationship and are therefore not functional to collective bargaining. 
 
The narrow and literal interpretation of section 187(10(c) by the superior courts have resulted 
in a situation where the wisdom of outlawing dismissal lock-out which is far better than a 
permanent dismissal is strongly questioned.  Whilst the outlawing of a dismissal lock-out had 
nobles intentions of improving the bargaining strength of employees, the interpretation of 
section 187(1)(c) has had the opposite effect.  At least under the 1956 Labour Relations Act, 
the offer of re-employment was available within the context of bargaining.  As things stand 
now, the dismissals are final and not subject to being withdrawn.  
 
It is this anomalous situation that has resulted in calls for the following measures: 
 
• Removal of section 187(1)(c) from the automatically unfair dismissals category. 
 
• Removal of the prohibition on the use of replacement labour in employer initiated lock-
outs. 
 
• Use of the causation test, which is somewhat stricter than the “purpose” test. 
 
However, the superior courts have rule that section 187(1)(c) only impacts on conditional 
dismissals.  Employers have to ensure that when dismissing within the context of collective 
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bargaining, there is no indication of any intention to re-employ the dismissed employees.  In 
this way, the dismissal will be out of the reach of section 187(1)(c).  The implications of this 
interpretation for collective bargaining are quite ghastly.  The possibility of employers, during 
negotiations, raising the threat of permanent dismissals on operational requirements ground 
(which the courts have ruled are permissible) when they do not get their way, are quite high. 
One would have thought that the courts would have been much stricter when ascertaining 
whether a dismissal, that arises within the context of collective bargaining, is really based on 
operational requirements or is used to compel employees to accept a demand. 
 
Given, the fact that one of the purposes of the 1995 Labour Relations Act is to advance social 
justice,178
Thompson
 the courts should have shown greater appreciation for the inherent nature of 
inequality that characterizes the employer-employee relationship.  By not doing so the courts 
prejudiced the employee’s bargaining strength through a narrow interpretation of section 
187(1)(c) which only serves to give employers an upper hand in the collective bargaining 
process by permitting them to resort to permanent dismissals when they do not succeed easily 
in collective bargaining, under the guise of operational requirements. 
 
179
“Given that any economic consideration, from basic viability to abundant profit, may 
qualify as an operational requirement, there is no item of collective bargaining immune to 
the negotiating attack that non-acceptance of a demand may end in dismissal tears.  If an 
employer may, in the very bargaining process, raise the spectre of dismissal in relation to 
wages and benefits and anything else, not much remains of a protected right to strike 
either.  The courts, it is suggested, should regard the operational requirements claim with 
a healthy measure of scepticism, and use the fairness filter to sort the chaff from the 
corn.” 
 sums the position up aptly: 
 
                                                 
178  S 1. 
179  “Bargaining over Business Imperatives: The Music of the Spheres after Fry’s Metals” at 710. 
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